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Politics inevitably runs in families. Notable among those who have shaped the
political landscape of Massachusetts are the Harringtons of the city of Salem.
Over the course of five generations, they produced several talented Irish-American
politicians who played a major role in state politics and rose to prominent posi-
tions of power in the Democratic party. This article centers on the lives and careers
of Joseph Harrington and his son Michael, both of whom ran for Congress some
twenty-eight years apart. Its treatment of these two congressional races is detailed
and insightful. Attention is also directed to the careers of Kevin Harrington and
his son Neil, each of whom made his mark in state and local politics. All came to
grips with mastering the complex role of politician. An irresistible story, like most
epic stories, especially those that involve family dynamics, its roots are deep, the
rivalries great, the wounds raw, and the implications complex. All paid a personal
price for power. Part of its duality mirrors closely the rise and decline of the Irish
in the political life of the commonwealth.
It is never easy to explain to a later generation the achievements of an earlier one in
shattering an unacceptable status quo, because these achievements in turn have become a
status quo beyond which it wishes to advance.
Ethnicity and Religion in Salem Politics
Anyone familiar with Massachusetts knows that 6 million people live in its 351 cities
and towns, where multiple cultures and diverse traditions abound. The state also has a
fairly competitive party system and a dramatically contested past. Today, the Sixth Con-
gressional District encompasses the city of Salem and twenty-five other North Shore
municipalities. Salem, the county seat of Essex, is steeped in American history. Settled
by the morally rigid Puritans in 1626, it was the place where, in the 1690s, men fearing
the sorcery of witches hanged women. Later its courageous sea captains sailed to the Far
East in search of trade and returned in their ships laden with silk, ivory, and other
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precious cargo. The prosperous captains built their stately mansions on Federal and
Chestnut streets in Salem. Designed by the noted architect Samuel McIntire, these vener-
able homes were adorned with the traditional widow’s walk on the rooftops. The small
city was also where Nathaniel Hawthorne worked as a customs inspector and wrote his
famous novel The House of the Seven Gables. Joseph Smith, the Mormon prophet whose
writings inspired the founders of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, once
predicted that gold would be found in Salem. In 1836, Smith returned to the town to
explore the possibility of establishing a Mormon religious colony there.1
Until 1836 the town of Salem was governed by a board of selectmen. When the mu-
nicipality became a city and adopted a mayor-council form of government, Leverett
Saltonstall was elected its first mayor, serving from 1836 to 1837. The Saltonstall ances-
try traces back to the fourteenth century in England. The original Saltonstall, Sir Rich-
ard, came to Massachusetts in 1630. Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century,
all the Salem mayors were native-stock Protestants. These old-line Yankees were mostly
Whigs and Republicans by party affiliation. Abolitionists, temperance men, anti-Catho-
lic nativists, and moral reformers were often the same men.
Protestant hatred of Catholics and fear of papal authority played a large part in Ameri-
can nativism. As John Higham observed, “Anti-Catholic nativism, aiming at stiff natural-
ization laws and exclusion of Catholics and foreigners from public office, completely
overshadowed every other nativist tradition.”2 Romanism inevitably conflicted with free
inquiry and liberty of conscience. Playing upon fears of popery was a chief means of
fund-raising and reducing internal strife among Protestants. Ethnicity, religion, temper-
ance, abolition, and the controversy over slavery shaped party loyalties. These Yankee
politicians embodied an ideal of public service with their noblesse oblige and social
consciousness. The Bay State, like the rest of the nation, was traumatized by the Civil
War and transformed by industrialization. Massive immigration and expansive urban
growth produced an increasingly diverse population; it also produced fierce rivalries
among ethnic communities.
Irish Catholics first arrived in Salem around 1833. Many worked in the leather indus-
try, the woolen mills, and on the railroads. Their assimilation into society was slow and
painful as they encountered a hostile environment of religious intolerance and system-
atic bigotry. With their strange brogue, peculiar clothes, wrong religion, willingness to
work for low wages, and other distinctive but unloved traits, the Irish suffered discrimi-
nation and prejudice. They felt isolated in Salem and moved preponderantly to the
northern side of town where a new ward encompassing most of “Corktown” was created.
There the Irish built St. Mary’s Catholic Church, which served until the chapel proved
too small to accommodate the increasing number of Catholic immigrants. In 1857
ground was broken for the Immaculate Conception Church; on its completion, the entire
congregation of St. Mary’s was relocated to the new edifice.
As a despised minority, the Irish already had reason enough to resent middle- and
upper-class Protestants who possessed wealth and status and seemed disposed to social
snobbery. Relations between the two groups had many abrasive edges. Even when ex-
ploitative economic relationships and class differences did not exacerbate tensions and
resentments, religion and culture caused hostility. The Irish politicians came to City Hall
as outcasts, and as people scorned, they had no great respect for the scorners or their
vaunted principles of government. Scarred emotionally by their experience of cruel
oppression at the hands of the British, they brought with them clannishness, a talent for
extralegal politics, and a tradition of personal loyalty to leaders. Somewhat in the man-
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ner of ex-colonials who have grown used to bribery and other means of cheating the
prevailing powers, the Irish immigrant bosses set some unsavory records for public plun-
dering. But they were no more unethical than the mill owners and business moguls who
oppressed and exploited their people.
Over the years the issues that divided the Yankees and the Irish were rooted in two
political cultures competing for dominance. As Paul Peterson points out,
On the one side, the Catholic immigrant, whose culture emphasized family, neighbor-
hood, and friendship ties, treated politics as another marketplace in which particularistic
self-interests could be pursued. On the other side, the middle-class Protestant reared in a
milieu that delineated man’s individuality, separateness, and equality before God, under-
stood politics to be the pursuit of “justice,” the ground upon which one created a “city
on the hill” that would radiate its worth to the surrounding countryside.3
There is much to be said for this analysis. Many conflicts in Salem and other Bay State
cities divided sharply along these lines. Patronage and corruption lubricated the friction
between the world of equality and the world of privilege.
In cities like Salem, successive waves of new immigrants came to the fore and elected
mayors, and in the following years the office gradually passed from Yankee to Irish,
Jewish, French, Italian, and Lithuanian ethnics in that particular order.4 The turning point
for the Irish came in 1900, when John F. Hurley was elected the first Catholic mayor.
Ordinary working people had discovered their power. Religion and ethnic politics obvi-
ously blended well.5
The Ascent of the Harringtons
Seen against this background, the Harringtons plunged heartily into ethnic politics in
Salem, where they built their political base and gradually attained considerable power.
As political aspirants, they used their holding office in the city and Democratic party
politics as available steppingstones. They were part of the Irish political ascendancy that
witnessed generations of bitter and unyielding conflict between Yankee Protestants and
Irish Catholics. Ardent Democrats, they maintained their power mainly through their use
of patronage, attention to the demands of competing ethnic groups, and providing pub-
lic services through partisan channels. In an era when class hatred, religious antagonism,
and ethnic resentment were rampant, it was important to take care of one’s own. North
Salem was a neighborhood of the lower working class, most of whom were Irish. The
“lace curtain” Irish lived in the upscale Broad Street section of the city. These voter-rich
precincts in the high turnout section of the city provided the Harringtons with a reliable
base of Democratic support.
In tracing their family history, one finds that the family came from humble origins in
Ireland. Cornelius Harrington, the patriarch, was born in Skibbereen in 1833. In 1847, at
the age of fourteen, he left his famine-stricken homeland to escape the ravages and dev-
astation of the great hunger. Skibbereen, in the western part of County Cork, was one of
the worst afflicted towns. So Cornelius and his parents belonged to the masses of land-
less or evicted peasantry who wandered into cities and took whatever jobs they could
find. As a young man, he immigrated to London, where he eventually found work as an
English bobby. Like most ethnic policemen, he was assigned to patrol the dreadful Irish
slums in the Limehouse section of the city. His son, Cornelius F. Harrington, was born in
London in 1864 on Petticut Lane. When he was five years old, his immigrant parents
took him from London to Beverly, Massachusetts, where they lived at 12 Rantoul Street
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in the Goat Hill area. Young Cornelius grew up in Beverly, becoming familiar with its
class and ethnic tensions. An Irish immigrant with neither family support nor education,
the son worked in the shoe and boot trade until he gained enough experience to become
a union activist. He was arrested for organizing shoe workers in the mill cities of
Haverhill and Manchester, New Hampshire. Before long, Cornelius married Ellen T.
Griffin, who worked in the Pequot mills in Salem. Her mother, Ann Conroy, an Irish girl
who worked in the woolen mills, had come to Lowell with a rich English Protestant
family. The head of that family had been hired to manage the mills.6
City directories indicate that the Harringtons moved from Beverly to Salem in 1893.
They lived briefly at 1 Ferry Street and 2 Essex Street before acquiring their own home at
57 Osgood Street. This modest house was off Bridge Street on a dead end that backed up
to Collins Cove. Cornelius F. Harrington (1864–1943) was listed in the city directory as
an “edge setter” by trade. He outlived his son Cornelius J. Harrington (1890–1935)
whose occupation was that of a plumber. They became active in Salem politics and were
part of the superbly organized Hurley political machine.
When reform of the Salem police force required a supportive marshal, Mayor Henry P.
Benson appointed Cornelius F. Harrington to the post in 1916. This prestigious plum
was then the modern equivalent of city police chief. Benson, one of Salem’s wealthiest
men, managed the Naumkeag Steam Cotton Company, which was established in 1847.
Later known as the Pequot mills, it was the largest employer in the city. Presumably,
Benson appointed Harrington to curry favor with the Irish, but most Yankee Protestants
resented the Irish courtship. Recalling  life at her grandparents’ home at 57 Osgood
Street, Carol [Harrington] Mulholland wrote,
For my part, I found the Harringtons quite fascinating. On Sundays my father [Leo F.
Harrington] would take my brother and me to his family home, a very short walk from
our house, first because he adored his mother and wanted to visit with her, and second
because he wanted to give my mother a few hours respite. Those were great times for
me. The Harrington household was very “casual.” The kitchen table covered with an oil
cloth, was never unset. Someone was always eating. The beds were never made, some-
one was always sleeping. There were in the family six sons and three daughters. Grand-
father Harrington, and the male members of the family sat around the kitchen table or
out on the porch and discussed politics and unions. Grandmother Harrington, a tall,
long-necked woman, straight as a ram rod, with a sharp tongue and a keen sense of
humor waited on the men, all the while making sarcastic remarks about her husband’s
fondness for poetry and conversation and his complete lack of fondness for physical
labor. (If she were alive today she would be the president of “NOW”). Meanwhile,
hordes of grandchildren ran unrestrained through the house, whooping and screaming
and being totally destructive. Generally, I preferred sitting with the grown-ups listening
to their talk and would remain there as long as I was permitted to do so.7
The Harrington household was typical of many Irish-Americans. Ironically, the
French-Canadians outnumbered the Irish in Salem. During the second half of the nine-
teenth century, the owners of the Pequot mills imported Canadian laborers to work at
substandard wages. As recently as 1980, 43 percent of Salem’s population, which hov-
ered around 40,000, was French-Canadian. Constant rivalries sprang up between the
French, Irish, and Polish residents. The French and Irish hated each other, but the Irish
were more efficient at organizing their community. They also had the advantage of
speaking English and being familiar with county government based on their experience
in Ireland. Since the French frequently quarreled among themselves, they had difficulty
putting together a winning coalition. Yet they could defeat a candidate for mayor if they
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disliked that person.8 Given their lack of cohesiveness, they had to wait until 1973 for
Jean A. Levesque to become the first French mayor of Salem. He filled the unexpired
term of Samuel E. Zoll, the first Jewish mayor, who served from 1970 to1973. Zoll de-
parted from the mayor’s office to accept a state judgeship. Levesque then served a total
of five terms, from 1973 to 1983. The first Italian mayor, Anthony V. Salvo, served for
three terms, from 1984 to 1989.
With Cornelius F. Harrington’s appointment as city marshal, the family had a political
foothold, and soon thereafter they were on their way. They advanced politically and
learned how to survive in the hurly-burly and internecine warfare of Massachusetts poli-
tics. None of them experienced smooth sailing. Their public careers had their ups and
downs in political good times and in bad. For better or worse, they experienced the perils
and travails that went with public life. It would shape the way they looked at the world,
at the public, at duty, at religion, at responsibility, at democracy, and at the cruel caprices
of life. For some, it was more like a bumpy roller coaster ride of electoral victories and
defeats. Most of all, they were doers who seemed more interested in getting things done
than in perpetuating themselves in office. Intent on solving problems, they did their best
to resolve them and served the public well.
Over time, the Harringtons provided leadership that inspired loyalty and cooperation
among their supporters. One served as city marshal, two as mayor of Salem; two served in
the state Senate; two in the Massachusetts House of Representatives; and one was sent to
Congress. At one time or another, four served on the Salem City Council. For eighty-one
years, they were a force to be reckoned with in the Democratic party. In differing ways,
each made his presence felt in the political arena. They saw politics as an honorable
profession as well as an exciting adventure.
A Democratic Party Wheel Horse
A formidable adversary, Joseph B. Harrington, who was born in Salem on November 22,
1908, enjoyed a long public career in the Democratic party. The son of the city marshal,
he was the first family member to seek elective office. Possessed of charm, wit, and intel-
ligence, Joe Harrington was an interesting character with a magnetic personality who
described himself as a self-made man well tutored by life experience. Educated at St.
Mary’s Commercial School in Salem, he went to work in the contemporary labor force at
the age of fifteen. With meager family resources and holding down a state job as a clerk-
stenographer, he completed his schooling at the Salem Evening High School, where he
earned a high school diploma and graduated as valedictorian. Although his family could
not afford to send him to college, he became a voracious reader and a self-educated man.
Despite financial hardship, he was motivated enough to earn a law degree at Suffolk Law
School at night.9 To pay his way through law school, he trained trolley car operators,
whose jobs were being eliminated, in how to become bus drivers.
In those days a prospective lawyer did not need a college degree to take the bar exam.
Following his admission to the bar in 1932, Joseph Harrington married Elizabeth C.
Kenneally, who was a secretary for Salem mayor Edward A. Coffey. A smooth talker,
Harrington soon became a leading attorney in his hometown. He joined the Knights of
Columbus and entered politics. A slightly built man who stood six feet tall, he had cha-
risma and a social conscience. His identification with lower-income groups was impor-
tant to him. He was popular with party regulars, many of whom were working-class
people. These personal qualities, along with a mischievous sense of humor, became his
trademark.
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In the 1930s Harrington ran several times for city council before he was finally
elected in 1937. He was a brilliant and instinctive politician endowed with that gift for
symbolic gesture so beloved in the Irish community. It was a political world in which
geniality, compassion, and opportunism all had equal play. The Great Depression of the
1930s instilled in Harrington a genuine concern for ordinary people who were down and
out. His message would have great appeal to hungry and desperate people. What he
learned then shaped his subsequent thinking. He was intent on doing good and helping
those less fortunate, especially problem drinkers and alcoholics. Unlike the Protestant
elite, he did not disdain the drunkard. Quite to the contrary, he founded the North Shore
Council on Alcoholism, which created a network of services to take care of drunks and
ensure that they were not treated like common criminals.
In the late 1930s, Joe Harrington’s embrace of isolationism set him at odds with his
party’s leadership; but he was an Al Smith Democrat, not an FDR loyalist. The national
prominence of New York governor Alfred E. Smith stirred his Irish pride. When Smith ran
for the presidency in 1928, Harrington backed him enthusiastically. Smith in turn un-
leashed a powerful force for the Democratic party. “One of their own kind, Irish, Catholic,
big city son of immigrants,” observes Jerome Mileur, “Smith’s candidacy galvanized the
‘newer races’ of working class Democrats in Massachusetts, who marched to the polls in
unprecedented numbers to make him the first Democrat in the state’s history to win a
majority of the popular vote for President.”10
There are great waves or cycles to the rhythm of politics, and the 1928 presidential
election marked a significant turning point in Massachusetts, when one wave was ending
and another was ready to begin. Since the Civil War, the Republicans had been the domi-
nant party in the Bay State. But the 1928 election would be the last time they would
monopolize state politics. From 1930 to 1960, the Democrats won six of eight presiden-
tial elections, divided the two U.S. Senate seats evenly with the Republicans, won the
governorship in nine of sixteen elections, split those for attorney general and secretary of
state, while dominating elections for treasurer and auditor.11
Active in Democratic politics in Essex County, Joe Harrington was blessed with a
magnificent baritone voice. His ability to beguile the urban masses attracted the atten-
tion of party bosses. He was much in demand as an after-dinner speaker. Joe Harrington
was a man on a mission trying to win elections, but also trying to build a party. In 1940
he ran for the state Senate against Republican Raymond H. Trefry of Marblehead, whose
Yankee credentials were impeccable. A lawyer by profession, Trefry was no ordinary run-
of-the-mill politician. A well-known Republican and Marblehead town counsel, he was a
two-term incumbent seeking a third term. He was the heavy favorite while Harrington’s
prospects looked rather dim. Many local Republicans were miffed at Trefry, because he
was supposed to have vacated his seat at the end of his second term and made it avail-
able for some other deserving Republican. Intoxicated with the elixir of power, he was in
trouble with the base of his party.
At the time, the second Essex senatorial district was considered an impregnable Re-
publican stronghold encompassing Salem, Beverly, Danvers, and Marblehead. The local
Republican committees had agreed that the seat be rotated among the party faithful in
these four communities. Trefry’s predicament, coupled with election year presidential
politics and the gravitational pull of FDR’s coattails, contributed to Harrington’s stun-
ning upset victory. Harrington won by the narrow margin of 423 votes, collecting 22,675
votes as compared with 22,252 for Trefry. The Salem Democrat carried his hometown by
7,877 votes. Commenting on the outcome, the Salem Evening News proudly boasted, “In
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the most stunning upset in local political history of recent record at least, Councillor
Joseph B. Harrington of Salem, veteran of many political storms despite his youth,
staged a knockout over his Republican opponent, Raymond H. Trefry of Marblehead in
the hotly contested battle for state senator in the Second Essex district. It was an amazing
victory and came as a stunning blow to Republicans who have always carried this dis-
trict before without any trouble.”12
Joe Harrington’s hunger for office would not subside there. Up or out became his
credo. Counting on his continuing popularity, party leaders asked him to run for Con-
gress in 1941. He could run for higher office without giving up his state Senate incum-
bency, known in politics as being in the catbird seat. He had everything to gain and
nothing to lose, but things did not turn out as he expected. More about that disastrous
campaign shortly.
Later in life, Joe Harrington retired from politics. The politician had become a legend;
the man had become a myth. Governor Foster Furcolo honored the legend by appointing
him a state judge. Judge Harrington often had lunch at the Hawthorne Hotel, where a
special table was held for him in the dining room known as the Main Brace. There he
discussed politics with his old political cronies. For relaxation, he purchased a used
thirty-six-foot cabin cruiser, which he named the Wanderer. During the summer months,
when court sessions were light and the judiciary normally adjourned by noon, he invited
friends to cruise with him in the waters off Salem. Sometimes the judge traveled to
Gloucester by boat to preside over trials there. All his life he took pleasure in his daily
work, in using his power and celebrity to help others less fortunate than he.
The 1941 Special Election
To appreciate this election, it is necessary to reconstruct American history as Joseph
Harrington and his generation understood it. It was an extraordinary time of domestic
social change, international struggle, political extremism and nuclear peril. Perhaps the
best place to start is October 19, 1941, the day Congressman Lawrence J. Connery died
in office. A lifelong Democrat and native of Lynn, he had succeeded his brother William
P. Connery who had died in office in September 1937. The latter had long been recog-
nized as a staunch advocate of labor in Massachusetts. He had cosponsored the Wagner-
Connery Labor Act of 1935, which created the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB).13 This key piece of New Deal legislation reasserted the right of workers to form
unions without being harassed by their employers. It also empowered the NLRB to deter-
mine “unfair labor practices” against which wage earners could complain without fear of
reprisal from their bosses.
Lawrence Connery’s death created a vacancy and the need for a special election. The
primary was set for December 16, 1941, and the special election was to be held two
weeks later, on December 30. All of which meant that the candidates vying for the vacant
seat had two months to campaign.
Nine Democrats and two Republicans took out nomination papers. In addition to
Harrington, the Democrats included Thomas J. Lane, a state senator from Lawrence;
Charles Hogan, a state senator from Lynn; Fred Manning, a twelve-year mayor of Lynn;
Edward D. Connery of Chelsea; Frederick J. Myers of Boston; Arthur M. McCarthy of
Winthrop; George J. O’Shea, a state representative from Lynn; and V. Frederick Sano of
Lynn. Since the Seventh Congressional District was overwhelmingly Democratic, the
Republicans provided only token opposition. They recruited John H. Gavin of Lawrence
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and C. F. Nelson Pratt, a former state representative from Saugus. Pratt and Harrington
were mortal political enemies. Edward Connery was obviously trying to trade on the
similarity of names with the deceased congressman. Not all the candidates, including
Harrington, lived in the district, but there was no residency requirement. Because of
Republican gerrymandering, only Ward Four in Salem was part of the district.
With a population of 100,000, Lynn, a major shoe manufacturing center, was the larg-
est city in the district and the fifth largest in the state. The district contained two of the
largest industries in the commonwealth — the General Electric plant in Lynn employed
more than 20,000 workers, while the American Woolen Company in Lawrence was the
world’s largest woolen mill. At the time, Lawrence was the nation’s leading producer of
worsted goods, its mills providing jobs for more than 30,000 workers.
Unless either Harrington or Hogan dropped out of the race, the pundits were saying,
Tom Lane would be the next congressman. Harrington and Hogan were competing for
the same bloc of votes. They would kill each other off for Lane’s benefit. So Hogan de-
cided to drop out, which cleared the way for Harrington, at least in southern Essex. It was
a crowded field in which Lane, Manning, and Harrington soon emerged as the early
front-runners.
During his first year in the state Senate, Joe Harrington had acquired a reputation as a
silver-tongued orator. Often lacing his speeches with a touch of wit and sarcasm, he was a
leader who could rally followers to a cause with the power of his deep, rich voice; but he
had a cutting edge to his florid oratory. Whenever he took the floor in the Senate, the
word quickly spread throughout the State House and people rushed to the gallery to hear
him — he was that kind of orator. Cornelius Dalton, a veteran Boston Traveler reporter,
wrote, “There were a few men who had his eloquence and a few men who were as effec-
tive in debate, but no legislator in modern times had both these gifts in such abundant
measure.”14 Not only that, Harrington was a press favorite, always good for a photograph
and a ready quote. Sometimes, he was too outspoken for his own good — he seldom
pulled his punches.
In 1941, Harrington gained considerable recognition at the impeachment trial of
seventy-six-year-old Daniel H. Coakley, an attorney from Brighton and a member of the
governor’s council for the past nine years. By all accounts, Coakley was a despicable
character who specialized in blackmail and operated a sexual entrapment racket, or bad-
ger game. His accomplices in these sexual shakedowns were Nathan Tufts and Joseph
Pelletier, the chief law enforcement officers of the two most populous counties in Massa-
chusetts. Jack Beatty wrote,
A prostitute hired by the trio would lure a rich elderly gentleman to a hotel room. When
they were in flagrante delicto, an irate “husband” or “father” of the woman would burst
in, or the police would enter and charge the man with fornication or contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. The man would be told that an alienation of affection suit could
be avoided only by hiring attorney Daniel H. Coakley, who by a miracle of legal art
would persuade either District Attorney Tufts or District Attorney Pelletier, depending
on the location of the tryst, to “not pros” the suit.15
In 1922, the three men were disbarred, and the two district attorneys were removed from
office by the state Supreme Judicial Court.
Fourteen charges of fraud and misconduct in office were leveled against Coakley by
the lower house of the Massachusetts legislature. The charges involved pardons that had
been granted to Raymond L. S. Patriarca, later to become notorious as an organized
crime boss, and Frank W. Potter and Maurice Limon between 1935 and 1938. Coakley
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was defended by Senator Harrington and a prominent black lawyer, William H. Lewis, a
former assistant U.S. attorney. They were under pressure not to yield to the Republicans.
The impeachment trial was conducted by the Republican-controlled Senate. The verdict
was returned at midnight on October 3, 1941. The Republicans found Coakley guilty
and voted to remove him from office and to disqualify him from ever again holding
public office.16
Of course, Harrington came to the Senate with this problem on his agenda. He could
see the partisan storm coming, seeking in the timing of the impeachment some clue to
Republican motives, which soon became evident. At stake was control of the eight-
member governor’s council, an institution that was a vestige of colonial times and served
as a political check on the governor. The councilors not only approved pardons and
parole but also confirmed judicial appointments. By ousting Coakley, the Republicans
were able to gain majority control of the council. Politics was a blood sport and played
for keeps. Republican governor Leverett Saltonstall was no doubt pleased with the ulti-
mate outcome — he no longer had to worry about the Democratic councilors blocking
his contemplated courses of action.
Harrington had entered politics in the face of the impending European war. With the
rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany during the 1930s, a series of international events had
long dominated foreign news. Everyone who read the newspapers knew that Japan had
seized Manchuria from China in 1932 and that Italy had invaded and conquered Ethio-
pia in 1935. On top of which, the Rhineland crisis broke in 1936, when Hitler suddenly
marched troops into that presumably demilitarized zone. This was followed by the Czech
crisis of 1938, when Britain, France, and Italy bought temporary peace at the Munich
conference by giving Hitler crucial portions of Czechoslovakia. The winds of war were
swirling.
These disturbing events contributed to caution abroad and at home. Paralyzed by the
fear of war and by the Great Depression, Britain and France at first acquiesced to German
expansion, but concluded after Munich that Hitler could not be appeased. The British
signed a defense pact with Poland, and when Hitler invaded Poland on September 1,
1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany. Ignoring these warning signs, many
Americans of all political persuasions buried their heads in the sand and latched on to
isolationism as their security blanket. Nowhere was this phenomenon more prevalent
than in Massachusetts. The state was a hotbed of antiwar sentiment, especially among
the Irish. Indeed, it grew stronger.
In May 1940, as the Nazis overran Norway and marched west, Neville Chamberlain,
the British prime minister associated with Munich, won a vote of confidence from the
House of Commons but with forty abstentions on his own side. That vote so compro-
mised Chamberlain’s standing in the conservative Tory party, the press, and the country
that he felt compelled to step down. Winston Churchill never forgot either the event or
the lesson. He succeeded Chamberlain as prime minister and was widely regarded as
having been right about the dangers of appeasement.
The U.S. presidential election of 1940 raised the specter of whether America would
intervene or stay out of the war that was currently raging in Europe. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s exchange with England of aging destroyers in return for naval bases alien-
ated most Irish-Americans. In Massachusetts, the Irish embraced the doctrine of isolation-
ism. They praised Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy for his reluctance to aid the British.
U.S. Senator David I. Walsh, a strong isolationist, reported to be in “a towering rage”
when he learned about the sale of Navy ships and munitions, threatened to force legisla-
tion prohibiting such sales.17
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In Wendell Willkie, the Republicans had a far more energetic nominee than Alf
Landon had been in 1936. Unlike Landon, who had stayed out of Massachusetts, Willkie
twice visited Boston, where he spoke to a large crowd of 35,000 people at Braves Field
and received a cordial audience with Cardinal William O’Connell. He promised to re-
store prosperity and to keep “our boys out of Europe.” If Roosevelt were reelected,
Willkie predicted, American boys would be fighting within six months.
Alarmed by these developments, the Democrats patched up some of their differences
and rallied behind the president. Boston Mayor Maurice J. Tobin and Congressman John
W. McCormack vigorously campaigned for him. Even a reluctant James Michael Curley,
who played upon the hatreds, fears, and insecurity of the Irish, reminded voters that he
had been the first politician in America to endorse Roosevelt eight years earlier. In addi-
tion, the state Federation of Labor, with all its political muscle, came through with a
ringing endorsement of FDR.
The Democrats pulled out all the stops. Outside speakers were summoned to the res-
cue. New York mayor Fiorello La Guardia wooed Italians on Roosevelt’s behalf. The
long-dominant Irish leadership of the Democratic party was being challenged more and
more by emerging Italian leaders. Many Italian-Americans, however, voted the Republi-
can ticket. From their perspective, Roosevelt had stabbed dictator Benito Mussolini in
the back on the eve of United States entry into World War II. Otherwise, the dominance
of the Republican party in Massachusetts would probably have deteriorated much
sooner.
Meanwhile, Detroit radio priest Father Charles Coughlin continued his savage attacks
against Roosevelt and his New Deal programs. He also spewed forth the venom of anti-
Semitism. His Jew-baiting Christian Front endorsed Wendell Willkie, and the priest’s
followers combed Irish neighborhoods in search of Republican votes. Italians in
Boston’s North End demonstrated in support of Mussolini and his armed aggression.
Similar to the Italian community, the Irish were stirred by events abroad. They despised
the English for their cruel, oppressive rule in Ireland and therefore they did not want
America to bail them out. Hence, they strongly objected to FDR’s destroyer–naval base
exchange. Their rabid Anglophobia was as blatant as it was transparent.
In January 1941, President Roosevelt pushed the isolationist nation closer to war
when he persuaded Congress to pass a Lend-Lease bill, which empowered him to transfer
war material to any country deemed vital to American interests, deferring payments for
those ships and arms. Almost simultaneously, Congressman John McCormack, who per-
sonified the Boston Irish, was the first Catholic to be named majority floor leader in the
House of Representatives, serving under the leadership of Speaker Sam Rayburn. Their
political relationship soon developed into what eventually became known as the Austin
to Boston connection. As a dyed-in-the-wool New Dealer, McCormack remained loyal to
Roosevelt and steadfastly supported his foreign and domestic policies. Social Security
had been enacted in 1935, and massive unemployment had been substantially reduced.
The depression was almost over but some still lingered.
After spending three years abroad, during which he met with various Nazi leaders,
Colonel Charles Lindbergh, the famed aviator, returned home in 1941 to speak against
American involvement in the European war. He became the leading spokesman for the
isolationist group Defend America First, a broad coalition that included such diverse
personalities as Burton K. Wheeler, the Democratic senator from Montana, Kathleen
Norris, a popular novelist, Kingman Brewster, the president of Yale University, and so-
cialist leader Norman Thomas. Lindbergh’s father had been a Minnesota congressman
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and staunch pacifist. As Midwesterners, they were die-hard isolationists. The popular
aviator was by far the biggest draw for the America First movement. He made thirteen
public appearances as its featured speaker in practically every region of the country, but
he could not conceal his thinly veiled anti-Semitism.18 His speech in Des Moines, Iowa,
revealed his negative feelings toward the Jews. Walter Winchell, the nation’s most power-
ful columnist and popular radio commentator, hounded him with charges of anti-
Semitism. The events surrounding those details set the stage for what followed.
Joe Harrington, the darling of the Irish with an engaging personality, read these signs
accordingly and tapped into what he perceived as a rich vein of isolationism. To that end
he deliberately distanced himself from Roosevelt, a formidable combination for his time.
An outspoken America Firster, he adopted the campaign slogan “American defense at any
expense, but no foreign war.” The Salem Democrat insisted that the congressional cam-
paign be devoted entirely to a debate over foreign policy. The Salem Evening News
observed, “Harrington, a leader in the American First Committee, is running on an out-
and-out isolationist platform.”19 He was stridently noninterventionist, and his stance won
him the solid support of the Irish. President Roosevelt’s recall of Joseph Kennedy as his
ambassador at the Court of St. James’s outraged many of Harrington’s constituents. Most
Republicans were opposed to American involvement in the war because they hated
Roosevelt and all that he stood for. The New Deal, with its social welfare programs, was
anathema to them. More significantly, FDR’s internationalist views were in direct oppo-
sition to the powerful isolationist wing of the Republican party. At the end of World War
I, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr., had led the charge in torpedoing America’s entry into
the League of Nations.
Whatever its merits, the Harrington strategy ran directly counter to the philosophy of
Thomas Lane and Fred Manning, his two main Democratic opponents, both of whom
supported FDR. Lane declared unequivocally that he was “casting [his] lot with the kind
of Americanism typified by President Roosevelt. I pledge my full support to his foreign
and domestic policy.”20 In addition to being pro-labor and an Irish-Catholic Democrat,
Lane was a military veteran who had fought in the trenches during World War I. He
gained the support of the American Legion and other veteran groups. Straddling the
political fence, Manning equivocated by saying that he would never vote for war but
would support Lend-Lease and other interventionist measures. Manning was trying to
have it both ways but was going nowhere at this stage of the campaign.
In marked contrast, Harrington stood before the public opposing the use of American
military power. Whenever he spoke, he emphasized his personal commitment to a nonin-
tervention policy. Speaking more bluntly, he boldly asserted that he was “100 per cent
opposed to President Roosevelt’s foreign policy and 100 per cent in support of the
Wheeler-Nye faction in Congress.”21 This statement drew the ire of important labor lead-
ers, who read an ominous portent into his words. The Massachusetts CIO, which was
riding high, launched a concerted drive to defeat him, insinuating that Harrington flirts
with Nazism. Joseph A. Salerno, president of the state CIO, along with other labor lead-
ers, endorsed Lane, which was revealing in terms of both its substance and tone. As
Salerno put it, “We must unite on one candidate if labor is to defeat the appeasers and the
candidates of the American Fascist party, known as the American First Committee.”22
Salerno was also the head of the Clothing Workers Union, many of whose members were
Jewish, and they were not about to support an isolationist.
Although Harrington came from a staunch union family, he did not win the support of
organized labor. According to John Mallen and George Blackwood, “Massachusetts
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unions [were] for the most part led by men rather like the state and local leaders of the
Democratic party, men whose orientation toward social problems is ‘meat and potatoes,’
immediate short-run economic benefits rather than broad social programs.”23 Since the
Roosevelt administration had initiated progressive labor legislation like the Wagner-
Connery Act, labor felt obliged to support FDR and the Democrats who identified with
him, so Lane was the direct beneficiary. In truth, Lane was under pressure from organized
labor to fall in line with FDR, much of which came from Lawrence, the scene of the fa-
mous Bread and Roses strike in 1912.
To add to his momentum, Lane was endorsed by the Connery Associates. This politi-
cal action committee, which bore the name of the two former congressmen, was head-
quartered in Lynn. Ironically, Mary A. Connery was married to James Harrington,
Joseph’s older brother. No doubt this awkward situation created family discord.
To offset labor’s opposition, Harrington sought the blessings of the America First
Committee, and several of its national leaders came to Massachusetts to campaign for
him. Among them were Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota and John T. Flynn, a col-
umnist for The New Republic and leader of the liberal flank of the America First move-
ment. They appeared together on the same platform with Harrington at antiwar rallies. In
addition, Charles Lindbergh endorsed him. A celebrated international hero, Lindbergh
had flown nonstop from New York to Paris in the Spirit of Saint Louis in 1927. His en-
dorsement was a major coup for Harrington, or so it seemed.
These endorsements turned out to be a mixed blessing because they did not sit well
with either liberals or the Jewish community. Liberals, of course, equated pacifism with
appeasement. Boston Jewry rallied against Hitlerism and raised money for those fleeing
from Nazi Germany. At this point, however, the extent of the Jewish genocide was not
well known. The America First movement offended most Jews, who could have felt only
antipathy. They did not support Harrington or contribute financially to his campaign.
Because he was a pacifist, Harrington was tagged as being anti-Semitic, an unfair charge.
Lindbergh’s biographer Scott Berg wrote, “While many of the other antiwar organiza-
tions had distinctly reactionary, often anti-Semitic, taints to them, America First seemed
to attract men and women of all ages, political persuasions, and religions, including a
number of influential Jews, among them Sidney Hertzberg, their publicity director, and
Lessing Rosenwald, one of the Sears-Roebuck heirs. Furthermore, noted an FBI report on
the organization, there was ‘a tremendous Jewish group’ subsidizing the movement,
using the Guggenheim Foundation as its front.”24
From Harrington’s perspective, American intervention in a European war was too high
a price to pay. In words that would resonate in the political life of his son twenty-eight
years later, he felt that Americans should not have to fight someone else’s fight. Despite
organized labor’s support of Lane, Harrington held a commanding lead. Public opinion
polls showed him well ahead of his primary rivals. Boston mayor Maurice Tobin consid-
ered Harrington a shoo-in.25
Timing, of course, was absolutely critical as far as Harrington’s prospects were con-
cerned, and he remained the favorite right up until December 7, 1941. On that fateful
Sunday morning, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in a surprise attack. The next day,
President Roosevelt appeared before a joint session of Congress and declared war
against Germany and Japan. The congressional race took an electrifying turn.
Fate had delivered an unexpected jolt. Almost overnight, the steam went out of the
America First movement. Under the circumstances, the public quickly rallied behind its
president at a time of national crisis. As a result, Harrington’s prospects evaporated like
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quicksilver. In a dramatic reversal of fortune, isolationism quickly became his Achilles’
heel. With only a week to go before the election, he could hardly halt his slippery slide.
The avalanche of war had, in effect, buried him. For several days everybody waited, but
the outcome seemed like a foregone conclusion.
When the voters went to the polls to make a plausible choice on Election Day, De-
cember 16, they rallied behind their wartime president in the spirit of national unity.
Lane benefited most from this show of patriotism. In the Democratic primary, Lane re-
ceived 17, 275 votes, Manning 8,994, and Harrington finished a humiliating third with
4,498 ballots.26 It was a crushing defeat that was hard for the Salem Democrat to swallow.
He was literally blown away. Who could have foreseen the shocking surprise at Pearl
Harbor? Putting it more bluntly, who could have predicted that the election would turn
on the political accident of events? Given Harrington’s political plight, his supporters
felt some empathy for him as a politician. In the Republican primary, Nelson Pratt picked
up 5,268 votes compared with 1,533 for John Garvin. Two weeks later, on December 30,
Lane drubbed Pratt by 7,616 votes in the special election.27
The Intervening Years
A basic rule of American politics holds that timing is everything. Paradoxically, Joe
Harrington got there because of good timing and lost because of bad timing. It was diffi-
cult for him to erase the memory of his defeat. Years later, on leaving Dini’s Restaurant in
Boston, he remarked to some friends, “ Remember Pearl Harbor? Will I ever forget it!”28
Yet he saw his career after 1941 in exactly the same terms as earlier. He returned to the
state Senate, where he finished the remainder of his unexpired term.
Harrington did not seek reelection in 1942 for good reason. The Republicans were
determined to regain the seat that Raymond Trefry lost in 1940. To counteract
Harrington’s popularity among the Irish, they ran J. Frank Hughes of Danvers, who did it
for them. Hughes was a popular Irish politician who had agreed to rotate the senatorial
seat. In 1944, Republican J. Elmer Callahan succeeded Hughes.  Callahan lived in the
lace curtain Broad Street section of Salem. Both Hughes and Callahan had purposely
been recruited to split the Irish vote.
Seeing the handwriting on the wall, Harrington decided to run instead for district
attorney of Essex County. His Republican opponent in 1942 was Hugh A. Cregg, a well-
known attorney from Methuen. At the outset of the campaign, William Enwright, the
editor of the Lynn Telegram News, who loathed Harrington, launched a vicious smear
campaign against him. Their personal feud stemmed from an earlier libel suit that
Harrington had won against the editor in court. Enwright now sought revenge and ac-
cused Harrington of being “a fascist and pro-Nazi.” It was a completely bogus issue de-
signed to deflect and destroy, but the strategy worked perfectly. Under wartime condi-
tions, Enwright’s poison-pen editorials proved damaging. Harrington lost Lynn, a blue-
collar community that normally went Democratic, by 4,116 votes. In the end, Cregg
defeated Harrington by a margin of 8,569 votes.29 The year 1942 was a banner one for
Massachusetts Republicans. Leverett Saltonstall won the governorship and Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr., was elected to the U.S. Senate.
In 1944 Harrington ran for state representative and won, defeating John M. Gray by
polling 4,643 votes to 3,443 for Gray.30 Because Harrington was redistricted in 1945, he
did not seek reelection, but he did not lose his taste for public service. In 1947 he ran for
mayor of Salem, defeating the Republican incumbent Edward Coffey, who had held the
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office from 1938 to 1947. Although municipal elections were by now nonpartisan, it was
the first time a Democrat had won the office in more than twenty-four years. The Repub-
licans had held the mayoralty since 1923. While serving as mayor, Harrington suffered a
severe heart attack. During the weeks of recovery and recuperation, he conducted city
affairs from his home.
As it turned out, Joe Harrington was destined to serve only a single term as mayor. On
seeking reelection in 1949, he inadvertently alienated the French. The popularized story,
still believed in Salem’s political community, was that he had intentionally insulted
them, but that version is not quite accurate. He was too smart to make such an incredible
blunder. What really happened is significantly different. A motorcycle policeman,
Wilfred Dansreau, was apparently seeking a promotion in rank. He went to see Monsi-
gnor Arthur Mercier, the pastor of St. Joseph’s Catholic Church, whose congregation was
predominantly French. Dansreau, who was notorious for nabbing speeding motorists,
asked the good monsignor to intercede with the mayor in his behalf, and the latter gladly
obliged. Persuaded finally that under civil service rules this could not be done,
Harrington turned down the request. Speaking from the pulpit at Sunday Mass, Monsi-
gnor Mercier told his congregation, “Obviously, the mayor must feel that he doesn’t
need the French vote.” These comments, however, were mistakenly attributed to
Harrington. No insult was more keenly felt than being considered irrelevant or unneces-
sary.
Consequently, Franco-Americans voted overwhelmingly for Francis X. Collins,
Harrington’s opponent. Collins, whose political strength lay in the Gallows Hill section
of the city,  had previously served on the local school committee. There was no primary
election in those days, and in a closely contested race, Collins defeated Harrington by
9,194 votes to 8,971. As the returns showing his narrow defeat came in, Harrington chal-
lenged the vote, but it was upheld after an official recount.
Capitalizing on good public relations, Collins remained in the mayor’s office for the
next twenty years. He kept city spending to a minimum and allowed its run-down public
schools to deteriorate even more. As an undergraduate at Harvard, Collins majored in
mathematics. Considered a genius with figures, he was able to keep the property tax rate
down. That was the secret to his success. But he benefited greatly from the legacy of his
predecessor. Mayor Joseph Harrington had persuaded the New England Power Company
to build an $80 million electricity generating plant in Salem in 1949. During the 1950s,
this private utility paid nearly 50 percent of the city’s total taxes.
Because a majority of the Salem schoolchildren attended parochial schools, local
taxpayers had been reluctant to improve their deteriorating public schools.31 Fourteen
years later, in 1963, Michael J. Harrington, Joseph’s son, challenged Collins for the may-
oralty. While campaigning for the office, Harrington declared unequivocally that he
would raise taxes to pay for better public schools. Such a posture, while courageous on
his part, no doubt cost him the election. He believed in telling things as they were, no
matter the consequences.32
After his 1949 mayoral defeat, Joe Harrington did not seek public office again. His
whole life had been wrapped up in politics, but his time had come and gone. In 1948,
Governor Paul Dever asked him to run for attorney general, but he declined. His career
had experienced as many ups and downs as his political hero Al Smith. In 1957, Gover-
nor Foster Furcolo appointed him a state judge. Harrington was assigned to the first
district court in Salem, where he presided for the next seven years. He seemed the very
essence of a judge, for he was charming, articulate, and intelligent. An icon of the local
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establishment, he impressed both sides with his fairness and good sense. More than one
associate characterized him as compassionate, especially with youthful offenders.
In 1960 Judge Harrington suffered a second heart attack, but it was milder than the
first. In 1962 he backed Endicott “Chub” Peabody for governor. Although he had retired
from politics, he could not resist taking a swipe at both Edward M. Kennedy and George
Cabot Lodge, labeling them wealthy interlopers who did not deserve to be elected to the
U.S. Senate. Harrington’s heart problems continued to plague him, and he flew to Texas
to have open-heart surgery at Houston Methodist Hospital. It was performed by Michael
DeBakey, then considered the leading surgeon in the country for this type of operation.
On February 3, 1964, while shaving before going to work in the morning, he died of a
heart attack at age fifty-six. The Salem Evening News paid him this fitting tribute:
Joe Harrington liked the little people because he was one of them and mingled among
them in his exciting life. The judge had known fame and frustration in his more than
half-century on earth and he was far and away the most colorful figure in this city’s
politics in this generation. His spell-binding oratory, his extemporaneous brilliance in a
living room, or on a political rostrum or on the bench, will not soon be duplicated. His
humor was matchless. Judge Harrington was a loyal friend to some and worthy foe to
others, but most of all, he was human. He made politics a noble and attractive calling
and was quick to defend those in the profession. He was the patriarch of a family clan
dedicated as few have been to the public service and a community stricken with grief is
quick to send condolences to his gracious widow and four sons.33
Meanwhile, Thomas Lane served in Congress for twenty years, from 1942 to 1962.
Since Lane came from a relatively safe Democratic district, he had no trouble holding on
to his congressional seat. But Lane, who was hardly an asset to the party, had been con-
victed of tax evasion and sent to federal prison. He was reelected to Congress in 1956,
shortly after his release from prison.
A protégé of his uncle Joe, Kevin B. Harrington, who served on the Salem City Coun-
cil, was encouraged to run for the state Senate in 1958. It was the same year that Maine’s
governor Edmund Muskie, the son of a Polish-born tailor, won a special election as U.S.
senator. For a Catholic to be elected in such a rock-ribbed Republican state as Maine
meant that the political dynamics in New England were changing. Sensing the change,
Kevin Harrington ran successfully for the state Senate.34 The Democrats won twenty-four
of the forty Senate seats in 1958, the year they first took control of the upper chamber.
The General Court was redistricted in 1959 on the basis of the 1955 state census.
Under this plan, the city of Salem was made a double district with regard to the House of
Representatives. Moreover, the town of Marblehead was dropped from the second Essex
senatorial district and the city of Peabody was added to it. This plan was challenged in
the courts, but the state Supreme Judicial Court upheld it. Michael Harrington was first
elected a state representative from Salem in 1964, about the time that the United States
was becoming more involved militarily in Vietnam.
When it came to Congress, Massachusetts had not been redistricted since 1940. This
redistricting was necessitated by the 1960 federal census figures, which showed that
states like Florida and California were growing faster than Massachusetts. This meant
that the Bay State would lose two House seats, thereby reducing its congressional del-
egation from fourteen to twelve members. As fate would have it, Kevin Harrington
chaired a special legislative committee on redistricting in 1962. Under a gerrymander he
devised, nine of the twelve new districts would be Democratic. It was shades of Elbridge
Gerry, who had invented gerrymandering back in 1812. Republican governor John Volpe
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threatened to veto any redistricting plan that was unfair to Republicans. He insisted that
the two major parties share the loss of the two congressional seats.
Four members of the Massachusetts congressional delegation met with Governor
Volpe to discuss the problem. They included Democrats Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill and
Edward P. Boland and Republicans Silvia Conte and William H. Bates. Considering that
the negotiating group was bipartisan, their performance was extraordinary, and they
reached common ground with remarkable dispatch. Seeking to protect their own dis-
tricts, they devised a bipartisan plan that differed significantly from Kevin Harrington’s.
The Republicans sacrificed the seat held by Laurence Curtis of Boston’s Back Bay —
the Curtis district was eliminated. The Democrats had an easier decision. Embarrassed by
the scandal of Thomas Lane languishing in jail for income tax evasion, they were will-
ing to sacrifice him — he was placed in the same district with Republican F. Bradford
Morse of Lowell. Although the new district was Democratic, Morse was a strong favorite
because of his popularity in the district, and he defeated Lane in the 1962 election.35
A small irony lay in the fact that Democrat George J. O’Shea, Jr., sought the Sixth Con-
gressional District seat in 1962. Like his father, who had run unsuccessfully in the spe-
cial election of 1941, he was a state representative from Lynn. The younger O’Shea lost
to the Republican incumbent William H. Bates, who had been in Congress since 1950.
The latter won despite the fact that the heavily Democratic cities of Lynn and Peabody
had been added to the new district. A former football star at Salem High School, Bates
was a very popular Irish Catholic Republican. He was reelected in 1964, 1966, and again
in 1968.
The Rise and Fall of Kevin Harrington
The political career of Kevin Harrington is worth examining in greater detail. Born in
Salem on January 9, 1929, he was the son of Cornelius the plumber. His mother was the
former Mary G. Whalen whose father had been an Irish stonemason. Kevin’s parents
lived at 7 Barton Street, where they raised six children — three boys and three girls.
Their father died of a heart attack in June 1935 in the depths of the Great Depression.
The three boys retained for life the questing intensity of children too early deprived of a
father. Typical of the Irish, Kevin entered politics while his brother Cornelius became a
diocesan priest.
The Reverend Cornelius J. Harrington, commonly known as Father Neil, had taught
at St. Sebastian’s Country Day School in Newton since 1947 and later became pastor of
Sacred Heart parish in Manchester. Their older brother, Joseph B. Harrington, an engi-
neer for the New England Telephone Company, was a political operative in his spare
time. In 1962 he coordinated the successful gubernatorial campaign of Endicott
Peabody in Essex County. As a reward for his efforts, Governor Peabody appointed Joe
to the Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission. Tall, ruggedly handsome, and a hulk
of a man, he was nicknamed Joe the Monster. Unfortunately, he died prematurely in
December 1967 at age forty-five, leaving behind a wife and five children.36
At six feet nine inches tall, Kevin Harrington cut a large figure and towered above
most people. In his youth he played basketball, first at St. Mary’s Boys High in Lynn,
then at St. Louis University, where he received an athletic scholarship and was educated
by German Jesuits. There he met and fell in love with the attractive Kathleen M. Carney,
a native of St. Louis. After graduation, Kevin obtained a job at newly created Merrimack
College in North Andover, where he taught courses in modern European history and
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American government and coached the basketball team. While teaching, he entered local
politics and was elected to the Salem City Council, where he served from 1957 to 1959.
From there he advanced to the state Senate.
In relatively short order, Kevin showed a unique ability to connect with people across
racial, religious, and class lines. He also demonstrated an ability to bargain and compro-
mise, which is necessary to succeed in politics. His temperament disposed him toward
making bargains. He accepted the inherent messiness of the real world and displayed a
tolerance for chaos and ambiguity. At the same time, he could efficiently sort out, accom-
modate, and integrate conflicting views. An astute and flexible politician, Harrington
was receptive to new ideas and always tried to keep his options open. He seldom allowed
himself to get rigidly boxed into a corner without finding some avenue of retreat.
Early in his career, Kevin learned the political lay of the land and became a key player
on Beacon Hill, where he earned a reputation of a cautious realist. He was more con-
cerned with delivering for his constituents than in undertaking risky political ventures
on which liberals constantly wanted to send him. No one was more adept at listening to
people, at understanding the nuances of an issue, and at finding new ways to move for-
ward. It was the kind of wisdom that can come only from hard fought political experi-
ence. He was a freshman Democratic state senator when the Democrats first took control
of that body in 1959.
As long as he was in office, Kevin Harrington, whom no one would mistake for a
liberal, made the most of his political opportunity, soon becoming a mover and shaker in
the Democratic party. With his background in college teaching, he served on the joint
Committee on Education. In 1962, Harrington led the battle over fiscal autonomy for the
public university. That same year, he chaired a blue-ribbon commission that made a
comprehensive study of public education in Massachusetts. Benjamin C. Willis, the
superintendent of schools in Chicago, served as staff director of the commission. Its 624-
page report laid the groundwork for a sweeping reorganization of the commonwealth’s
educational system. The landmark Willis-Harrington Act of 1965 established a new De-
partment of Education and an independent Board of Higher Education. The passage of
this important piece of legislation won Harrington statewide recognition.37 Some party
leaders began to view him as a potential gubernatorial candidate.
In the same way, Kevin Harrington used his power as a senator to ensure that Salem
State College received its share of state funding. He secured passage of legislation to
restore its physical plant and to add several desperately needed new buildings. In 1964
he fought to establish fiscal autonomy for the nine state colleges, which afforded them
the same protection that had been granted to the University of Massachusetts in 1962. In
taking such action, he helped put Salem State College on the map. He also worked for
the passage of bills to permit industrial and business expansion along Route 128 in
Peabody, Danvers, and Beverly. These were important trophies for a legislator to take
home to his local constituents.
In the twenty years from 1958 to1978, Kevin Harrington became a lawmaker of con-
siderable skill and experience. His other main concern was to gain power within the
Senate. When John Powers stepped down as Senate president in April 1964, Maurice
Donahue of Holyoke was chosen to succeed him. At the outset of the next legislative
session in January 1965, Harrington was promoted to majority floor leader. He later suc-
ceeded Donahue as Senate president, serving from January 1971 to July 1978.
Friend and foe alike acknowledged that Harrington was a powerful Senate president.
He sometimes moved and blocked legislation single-handedly and held the office longer
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than all but two of his eighty-two predecessors. No man had so much influence in the
General Court for so long. His  influence was derived mainly from his strong personality
and the patronage he controlled. Mockingly referred to as King Kevin by his colleagues,
he ruled the Senate with an iron hand and was adept at playing political hardball. Mike
Barnicle, a Boston Globe columnist, described him in masterly fashion.
In an age when politics is being played mostly by colorless clerks, Kevin Harrington
has always been Babe Ruth in a 48 extra-long. He is a tall Tip O’Neill, after eight
months at Weight Watchers; Lyndon Johnson without the cowboy boots; a back room
guy; a consensus builder. He is a pol to the teeth . . . He has led the Senate sometimes
with brute force, sometimes by juggling the different egos, playing off the different cast
of characters against one another, always knowing just how far he could push, twist,
shove, or coerce to convince the others.38
Even allowing for Barnicle’s expansiveness, this is a remarkable portrait of the Salem
Democrat as a versatile and accomplished politician. Barnicle knew Harrington well and
often spoke to men who knew him better. For his part, Harrington worked hard at achiev-
ing consensus. Capable of working with partisans of a different persuasion for the com-
mon good, he got along well with Republican governor Francis Sargent. Together, they
grappled with the new realities of changing life in America and dealt in practical fashion
with the pressing public issues of the day. Among other things, these included urban
transportation, public housing, civil rights, environmental protection, mental health, gun
control, special education, public welfare, juvenile and adult corrections, and social
services for children and the elderly.
Harrington, however, disagreed with Sargent when it came to the governor’s handling
of the prison riots that erupted in 1971–1972. These uprisings plunged the runaway state
prison system into chaos and endangered public safety. The riots caused acts of brutality,
murder, and a strike by the prison guards, all of which culminated in the firing of correc-
tions commissioner John O. Boone. Despite his disagreement with Governor Sargent,
Harrington blocked attempts to kill the prison furlough program.
During the mid-1970s, agitation for reinstatement of the death penalty gathered steam
in the legislature. The controversy waxed hot and heavy. Public opinion strongly fa-
vored the death penalty, but many people considered it unfair and unethical. They
viewed capital punishment as state-sanctioned murder. The commonwealth had last
executed someone in 1947. Almost three decades later, in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court
allowed the states to reinstate death-penalty laws. The high court ruled that the death
penalty was constitutional in the sense that it did not violate the prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. The issue, as debated in Massachusetts, focused on the
morality of the state’s taking a life in the pursuit of justice. Beset with conflicting de-
mands on both sides of this highly charged issue, Kevin Harrington blocked the legisla-
tion in the Senate, thereby preventing its passage, much to the delight of liberals. The
Boston Catholic Archdiocese was also pleased with the outcome.
To his credit, Harrington took more stand-up positions on legislation than most of his
predecessors. He showed exemplary leadership in 1975 during a fiscal crisis and crafted a
plan that enabled the state government to remain solvent and avoid bankruptcy, which
was no small accomplishment. At one point, he fast-gaveled a budget through without
taking a roll-call vote. Republican senators were furious at him, but his move carried the
day. Harrington also worked closely with Robert C. Wood, president of the University of
Massachusetts, in helping to restore the draconian budget cuts that Governor Michael
Dukakis had imposed on the public higher education system.
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Oddly enough, Harrington got along better with Republican governor Frank Sargent
than he did with Democratic governor Michael Dukakis. On taking office, Dukakis stood
firm on his lead-pipe guarantee of no new taxes though he conceded that the fiscal situa-
tion was much worse than he had anticipated. Harrington offered to help him by getting
a tax bill passed to finance the deficit, but Dukakis spurned his offer. The two men
seemed constantly at odds with each other. During his first term as governor, Dukakis was
arrogant and did not reach out and listen to people. Consequently, he alienated many
local Democrats, especially those who had backed him. His budget cuts in the field of
human services angered them, which resulted in their making trouble for him. His party
position was weak at the end of his first term when he appeared to be running out of
political strength.
In 1978 political insiders viewed Kevin Harrington as the Democrat most likely to
oust Dukakis from the governorship. Reporters Charles Kenney and Robert Turner
summed up the situation as follows:
The one most talked about, Harrington, was a smart, intimidatingly tall politician who
smoked huge cigars and took pleasure in wielding the considerable power of his office.
The Senate was his private reserve; to give it up would be difficult. Yet Dukakis’s
perceived vulnerability among insiders convinced Harrington that he could become
governor. He intended to declare his candidacy formally at the end of January, and in the
months preceding, he signed on people to raise money, take polls, and create advertis-
ing.39
Harrington’s strategy of bringing together all the disaffecteds was risky. It would have
involved his pushing aside the titular party leader and unseating a sitting governor
within his own party. Yet there was ample precedent for so doing. For example, in 1964,
Lieutenant Governor Frank Bellotti had narrowly beaten incumbent Governor Endicott
Peabody in a Democratic primary. Bellotti then lost to Republican John Volpe in the
general election. Be that as it may, the anticipated showdown between Harrington and
Dukakis never materialized.
Unfortunately for Harrington, his career ended abruptly when it was revealed that a
$2,000 check made out to him had been cashed at his Salem bank. The check was issued
by the New York consulting firm of McKee, Berger and Mansueto, which oversaw the
construction of the Boston campus of the University of Massachusetts at Columbia
Point. Corporate campaign contributions had been illegal in Massachusetts since 1946.
This disclosure came on the heels of a major scandal. On February 25, 1977, Joseph J. C.
DiCarlo, Democratic floor leader of the Senate, and Ronald C. MacKenzie, the Republi-
can whip, were convicted of extortion, conspiracy, and related federal crimes. The
charges against them involved the payment of $40,000 in bribes by MBM. After losing
an appeal, they were both sentenced to one year in federal prison and fined $5,000 each.
Asked by reporters about the alleged MBM check, Harrington admitted that the en-
dorsement on the back of the check appeared to be his, but insisted he did not remember
either endorsing or cashing it. But the damage had been done insofar as his position was
concerned. What internal battling had not done to destroy his power, the scandal charge
did. So fragile can political power be. Under the circumstances, Kevin Harrington did his
best to appear philosophical and statesmanlike, saying, in his own words, “Napoleon
said history is an agreed-upon myth. Well, this myth has been agreed upon, and I don’t
think it will change regardless of what happens. The myth is set, and has jelled.”40 Suffice
it to say that the check controversy abruptly terminated Harrington’s gubernatorial plans
and hastened his political demise. Whatever the case, he decided to call it quits and
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resigned from the Senate on July 31, 1978. At his departure, he lamented to the Salem
Evening News, “Doesn’t 20 years count for anything?”
Kevin Harrington was relegated to the sidelines, where he would remain for the rest of
his life. Although he was only forty-nine, he would never again hold elected public
office. The ultimate irony is that two months before leaving office, he pushed through
legislation that created an independent state Ethics Commission and a financial disclo-
sure law. But if his career seems to have ended on a note of despair, the impression one
has of him is not one of failure but of highly effective leadership.
All in the Family
Meanwhile, Michael Harrington, Kevin’s first cousin, had been elected to Congress. He
used his power on Capitol Hill in Washington to see that Salem received federal funds to
finance a revitalized downtown and waterfront. He was the driving force behind the
creation of the “Salem partnership,” which was both public and private in character. In
masterminding this initiative, he brought together all the major players who could help
shape the future of the small city. Once the partnership was launched, however, he
quickly disappeared into the woodwork and pursued other matters. He was a man in a
hurry and not especially given to patience. Because of his cerebral approach to politics
and his penchant for independence, opponents saw him as a different kind of Democrat.
He was a complicated man, not easily deciphered. No politician was more inscrutable or
difficult to fathom, for he was a man stubbornly determined to do what he thought right
regardless of the consequences.
Throughout the1960s and most of the 1970s, the dynamic duo of Kevin and Michael
Harrington wielded substantial political clout. To be sure, there was a certain potency to
the Harrington name. Perceived power, as most political science textbooks indicate, is
real power, even if it is blue smoke and mirrors. A reputation for strength, however, is
dependent on more than just personal qualities. Possession of the means to punish or
reward is also important. All of which prompted Salem businessman William Follett to
remark, “If the Harringtons can’t do it, it can’t be done.” Such was their reputation for
power.
Nancy Harrington, a first cousin to Kevin and Michael, made her mark as a profes-
sional academic administrator. Having finished as runner-up in a previous presidential
search, she became president of Salem State College in 1990. Her predecessor had lasted
only a short time and resigned as a result of a scandal. Nancy earned the position on her
own merits, not through political patronage as some people suspected. A smart and tal-
ented woman, she was the first graduate of the college to assume its top executive post.
She had previously been its dean of graduate and continuing education. Still at the
helm, she has performed admirably despite her critics. Like most successful administra-
tors, she has surrounded herself with a highly competent staff.41 Her older married sister,
Carol Mulholland, who was considered by her two siblings to be the brightest one of
them, graduated from Radcliffe College in 1944 with a major in sociology.
Her late brother, Lee F. Harrington, served as president of the Massachusetts Maritime
Academy in Buzzards Bay from 1972 to 1980. He had been educated at St. John’s Prep
in Danvers, graduating in 1941 as valedictorian, and was considered the best athlete in
his class. After finishing Holy Cross College in 1944, Lee joined the Navy during World
War II and saw combat in the South Pacific aboard the heavy cruiser U.S.S. Pittsburgh,
achieving the rank of lieutenant commander. Donald Flynn, a former student of
91
Harrington’s at Mass. Maritime, said that he was a fine math teacher and an excellent
baseball coach.42 He was very popular with his students. Sad to relate, he died of cancer
prematurely  in July 1980 at age fifty-five.
A fifth generation of Harringtons appeared on the Salem political scene in the early
1980s. Named for his grandfather out of family pride, Cornelius J. Harrington was the son
of Kevin Harrington and Kathleen Carney. He was educated at St. John’s Prep and at St.
Louis University. Known by his nickname Neil, he was elected to the local city council
and then served as mayor of Salem from 1990 to 1997. He was a well-intended and con-
scientious mayor who took his job seriously, but always in his father’s shadow, and he
had trouble finding his political footing. These years led to painful disagreements with
his second cousin. There was a fraying of the friendship, or what everyone had been led
to believe was a friendship, between Michael and Neil. No matter the grievance between
the two, Michael Harrington felt compelled to say publicly that “Neil doesn’t have the
stomach to be mayor.” They eventually broke with each other politically. In 1982, Neil
failed to win a five-way race for the Senate seat previously held by his father. Serving
four terms in the mayor’s office, he ultimately found his rhythm, but by then it was too
late. He lost his bid for reelection to a fifth term, then lost another bid to become sheriff
of Essex County.
A Rebel with a Cause
Michael J. Harrington, the son of Joseph and Elizabeth Harrington, like his father, was
born and raised in Salem. His birthday, September 2, 1936, made him a depression baby.
The family lived at 35 Winter Island Road at the far end of a long peninsula jutting out
into the ocean. Their house stood on a promontory with a commanding view of the sea in
the Salem Willows section of the city. At the time, it was a close-knit neighborhood
where the city’s poor farm and the U.S. Coast Guard station were located. Originally
developed in the 1880s as an amusement park for the urban masses, the Willows was the
site of the world’s largest outdoor salt water swimming pool, which was built during the
depression by the federal Works Progress Administration.43 The so-called Smith pool was
a New Deal pump-priming project of FDR’s.
A quarter-century later, Michael Harrington followed in his father’s footsteps and
pursued a similar career path, but he took a different route in obtaining his education. He
was educated in the parochial schools of Salem, then went to St. John’s Prep, where he
played baseball and excelled in his studies. As a youngster, Harrington often accompa-
nied his father in his political rounds at the local fire stations. He was a golden boy who
achieved academically at St. John’s and graduated as class valedictorian in 1954. From
there he went to Harvard University, class of 1958, and Harvard Law School, class of
1961. He began the private practice of law in Salem in 1962. After finishing law school,
he earned a master’s degree in public administration at Harvard’s Littauer School, later to
become the Kennedy School of Government. These ivy-strewn schools of higher learn-
ing were still Yankee Brahmin preserves. The family had come a long way since the early
days of St. Mary’s Commercial School. During his law school days, Michael married
Dorothy M. Leahy, who lived on North Street in Salem. A bright woman, she was consid-
ered a prize catch.
Some politicians are born to opportunity, others create opportunity, and still others
have opportunity thrust upon them. For Michael Harrington, it was a combination of all
three. Drawing on the political connections his father had established, he was elected to
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the Salem City Council at age twenty-three. Inspired by the idealism of President John F.
Kennedy, he served on the city council from 1960 to 1963, when he then ran for mayor
of Salem. However, he lost to the popular incumbent, Francis X. Collins, who had held
the office since 1950.
An Irish Catholic Democrat and a Harvard alumnus, Collins had unseated Joe
Harrington as mayor in 1949, defeating first the father and later the son. Collins, who
served an unprecedented ten terms as mayor from 1950 to 1969, didn’t like the
Harringtons for any number of reasons, including their mayoral fights. There was bad
blood between them, but years later, Mayor Neil Harrington named the Middle School in
Salem after Collins. This magnanimous gesture was an exercise in political reconcilia-
tion, but Neil felt that it was the right thing to do. Collins in turn appreciated the gesture.
Asked near the end of his life to estimate the value of the mayor’s office, Joe Harrington
concluded that it was “a political dead end.” This was a fair assessment, considering the
fact that both he and his grandnephew Neil ended their political careers as mayor.
Intelligent, energetic, and ambitious, Michael Harrington followed his father’s prag-
matic ethic of moving up or out when it came to politics. The opportunities for political
advancement were limited for even the most ambitious local politicians. Adept at turning
adversity to his advantage, Michael quickly rebounded from his mayoral defeat in 1963
and got himself elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives, where he served
for three consecutive terms, from 1964 to 1969. Considered a rising political star from
his earliest days in the legislature, he was perceived as a real comer with potential star
quality. His intelligence won him grudging acceptance from many of his fellow state
legislators. He ran successfully for Congress in 1969 when the antiwar movement was
gaining a head of steam. It was a natural progression to a public career that had long
defied the establishment.
The country in Michael’s day was vastly different from that of his father’s generation.
It was a period that witnessed the emergence of a counterculture and social forces that
produced great tensions and huge fissures running through society. Families were di-
vided over issues of war, drugs, sex, race, music, fashion, hairstyles, sideburns, and the
prevalent use of profanity in everyday speech. Richard Nixon was president of the
United States and Leonid Brezhnev was chairman of the Soviet Communist party. The
Cold War had reached its apogee.
Sensing that the present was alive with change, Michael Harrington ran for Congress
in opposition to the war in Vietnam, an audacious venture fraught with risk, for he was up
against entrenched establishment power. In taking such a courageous stance, Harrington
threw caution to the wind and bucked the system. He not only defied the Nixon adminis-
tration, but also defied his own party’s leadership. Under the previous Lyndon Johnson
administration, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara felt that some way had to be
found of neither abandoning Vietnam nor stepping up American involvement. No
stranger to controversy, Harrington made the increasingly unpopular war in Southeast
Asia the centerpiece of his congressional campaign. He became the anti-establishment
candidate.
The 1969 Special Election
Congressman William H. Bates, only fifty-two years old,  died of stomach cancer at
Bethesda Naval Hospital on June 22, 1969. A lifetime Republican, he had succeeded his
father, Congressman George J. Bates, who was killed in an airplane crash at Washington’s
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National Airport in November 1949. The senior Bates had served as mayor of Salem from
1924 to 1937, and his son pretty much followed in his father’s footsteps. Having gradu-
ated from Brown University and the Harvard Business School, Bill Bates served as a
Navy officer during World War II. In Congress, he championed a nuclear Navy and the
development of peaceful uses of atomic energy. During the Eisenhower administration,
he was a frequent golfing companion of Vice President Richard Nixon. His untimely
death created a vacancy in the office that set off a mad scramble for the open seat. The
primary election was set for August 26, to be followed by the special election on Septem-
ber 30, 1969.
Four Democrats —  Daniel Burke, a colorful Essex county commissioner from
Lynnfield; Thaddeus Buczko, the state auditor from Salem; Irving Kane, the mayor of
Lynn; and Michael Harrington, a state representative who had since moved from Salem
to Beverly, where his great-grandparents had originally settled — threw their hats in the
ring.  The Republicans recruited William L. Saltonstall, a state senator from Manchester,
and Francis W. Hatch, Jr., a state representative from Beverly Farms. The affluent suburbs
of Manchester and Beverly Farms are located on what is referred to as the Gold Coast.
Affectionately known by his nickname “Salty,” William Saltonstall was a social con-
servative and a dedicated environmentalist. A strong advocate of land use planning and
environmental reforms, he later sponsored legislation to improve the state’s fishing in-
dustry and to improve the safety of bicycling. His greatest single asset, however, was his
family name. An archetypal blue blood Yankee, he was the son of Leverett Saltonstall, a
Republican powerhouse who served four terms as Speaker of the Massachusetts House,
three terms as governor, and twenty-two years in the U.S. Senate. His great-grandfather
was a former mayor of Salem. Given his family’s illustrious legacy, name recognition and
visibility were not a problem for him.
To be sure, the road to the state Senate had been more than adequately prepared for
William Saltonstall. When he moved to Manchester in 1967, the Republicans persuaded
Phillip Graham, the incumbent state senator, to vacate his seat. For accommodating his
party in this regard, Graham was amply rewarded with a plum patronage job at the Mas-
sachusetts Turnpike Authority, whose employees were then not covered by the state
pension system. Before departing from office, Graham hastily pushed through legislation
that provided such coverage. The political trade-offs were abundantly clear.
Once again, it was a crowded primary field. The Sixth Congressional District had
always been a traditional Republican stronghold. In fact, the Republicans had held the
seat almost continuously since the end of the Civil War. There was only one interruption.
In 1874, Charles P. Thompson, a Democrat from Gloucester, had won the seat in what
proved to be an aberration. The dismal failures of Reconstruction, an economic depres-
sion, and the corruption scandals within the Grant administration made 1874 a disastrous
year for the Republican party nationally. Thompson served only one term from 1875 to
1877. Otherwise, the Republicans literally owned the congressional seat.
This was still pretty much the same congressional district that Governor Elbridge
Gerry had carved out in 1812 with only slight alterations here and there. It is a hard
district for a candidate to work politically because of its peculiar peninsular shape and
geography. Bounded on the northeast by the Atlantic Ocean, the district runs mostly in a
southern and westerly direction. Two-thirds of its vote comes out of the highly urban and
industrial southern portion of the district. The northern part consists mostly of small rural
towns and suburbs, which over the years have been a wellspring of Republicanism. With
such a crowded primary field, the Democrats risked fracturing their rich base of support
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in the cities of Haverhill, Lynn, Peabody, and Salem. Consequently, Thaddeus Buczko,
who actually took out running papers, decided to withdraw from the race. This was the
result of pressure from local Democratic leaders, who feared that he would split the eth-
nic vote and leave the party vulnerable in the special election.
A complex and controversial personality, Michael Harrington ran not so much as a
conservative Irish politician but more as a liberal Irish Catholic with Harvard credentials.
He had risen in his party because colleagues and constituents had four perceptions of
him, all of which he fostered. First, as a state legislator he had earned a reputation as a
maverick liberal who was nonconformist in his political behavior. As one observer put it,
“There were rules for Michael Harrington and then there were rules for everybody else.”
Even within the Democratic party, he stood against the wind. Second, he liked to shake
things up on Beacon Hill and didn’t mind stepping on sensitive toes, even if the toes
happened to be those of former governor Foster Furcolo, who had appointed his father a
state judge. Third, he displayed a penchant for leftist politics and supported Eugene
McCarthy for president in 1968. That year he joined disaffected Democrats who sought
to Dump the Hump, a move to deny Hubert Humphrey the party’s presidential nomina-
tion. Fourth, his several political assets included family name, financial resources,
proven vote-getting ability, and influential allies.44
To be sure, Michael Harrington was a complex person who was never easy about
revealing himself to others. His personality was multidimensional. To some he came
across not so much as a warmhearted liberal but more as a tough-minded, very self-cen-
tered, self-oriented man. In terms of public perception, he projected multiple images, not
all of which were favorable. Some critics saw him as a political opportunist who seemed
overly ambitious and desirous of too much power. Others perceived him as a knee-jerk
lefty and a complete flake whose ideas were simply unrealistic. Still others felt that he
was an arrogant politician who played by his own rules. Those who knew him best ad-
mired him the most, but few people remained neutral. He was loved and hated with equal
passion.
Even so, Harrington was shrewdly attuned to the temper of the times, when question-
ing authority and rebelling against it were very much in vogue among the younger gen-
eration. Once freed of the cant of nationalism, the myths and shibboleths of yesterday
were not only not believed by the young, but they became positively abhorrent. Many of
the older generation, unable to discern the difference between their own noble causes —
World War II for one example and Korea for another — and the attempt to “defend free-
dom” in Southeast Asia, were outraged by what they perceived as rejections of patrio-
tism. So there was a great deal of generational conflict.
The rap on Harrington as a state legislator was that he had one of the worst attendance
records in the General Court and that he sat in a back row and pouted. Many of these
criticisms were no doubt justified, but in politics they usually go with the territory. In
many ways, Harrington was an enigmatic figure who defied simplistic stereotyping, a
curious blend of idealist and rebel, but he was filled with contradictions and ambiguities.
In reality, he walked a fine line between overbearing arrogance and supreme self-confi-
dence. He lacked patience and did not suffer fools gladly. His public persona was not
that much different from his private one.
Politics for Harrington was a game of risk. Secure in his convictions about how the
world operated, he was willing to take certain risks that offended the establishment. His
leftist politics were hardly cautious. Given his political demeanor, he decided to go for
broke and made his opposition to the war in Vietnam the central issue of his campaign.
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Everything else, including shoe factory closings and the consequent loss of jobs, became
secondary. He also benefited from the fact that his father had been a legendary figure in
the Democratic party of Essex County. Unlike his father, however, he won the support of
the Jewish community, a key Democratic constituency. Many more Jews had moved to
the North Shore since the end of World War II. They not only supported Michael
Harrington with their votes but also contributed heavily to his campaign coffers. Jewish
activists like Jake Segal of Marblehead, Gertrude Weiss of Swampscott, Adele Ash of
Haverhill, and William Wasserman of Ipswich all played a vital role in his campaign.
Wasserman, who owned and published the North Shore Sunday newspaper, later became
Harrington’s administrative assistant in Congress.
Once they decided between themselves who would vie for the party’s nomination,
Michael named his cousin Kevin Harrington as his campaign manager. This proved a
wise choice on his part, considering what he ultimately set out to achieve. As majority
floor leader in the state Senate, Kevin was a respected and knowledgeable player on
Beacon Hill. In dealing with fellow politicians, he avoided the tactless errors of his
cousin Michael. Kevin could approach people and knew reasonably well just about
everybody who would matter to Michael’s success as a candidate. He understood the
dynamics of the race and gave Michael’s candidacy a certain degree of political legiti-
macy. Learning of Kevin’s role, Thomas McGee, a local Democratic leader in Lynn, felt
confident that the campaign would be in good hands “with the big guy in charge.” An
ex-Marine, McGee was a rough-hewn, conservative Irish politician, who had seen com-
bat in World War II. He was not particularly fond of Michael’s brand of liberalism. As it
turned out, Kevin Harrington proved to be an effective campaign manager. Inevitably
mistakes were made, but they were mostly scheduling problems and staffing decisions,
not serious blunders.
Michael Harrington’s advertising man, Robert Baker of Marblehead, devised a clever
theme for the election campaign. In trying to capture the public’s imagination, Baker
came up with two campaign slogans; one read Congress will never be the same; the other
proclaimed He has the guts to do what’s right.45 The Harrington people used the latter
slogan over and over again, plastering it on advertising billboards and printing in cam-
paign brochures. This slogan was accompanied by a picture of Harrington with his sports
jacket slung over his shoulder to convey the impression of an activist politician hard at
work. When the idea was originally proposed, Kevin Harrington was nervous about it. He
felt that the slogans sounded arrogant and somewhat flippant, but Michael overruled any
objections. He told his campaign staff, “If my conservative cousin is nervous, then we
should do it.”46 Initially, the billboards were field-tested in the northern part of the dis-
trict, and when they seemed to connect with the public, they were placed in the more
populated southern tier.
The Democratic primary was a three-man fight. The major issues focused on the anti-
ballistic-missiles system (ABM), the proposed federal interstate highway I-95, and the
Vietnam War. Sounding the right words and the right tone, Harrington spoke out against
the policy in Vietnam. “We are talking out of both sides of our mouths,” he said, “the
policy is bankrupt.”47 He expressed his dissatisfaction with Democrats and Republicans
alike and promised, if elected to Congress, to “shake up the system” on Capitol Hill.
Kane, on the other hand, expressed support for President Nixon’s Vietnam troop with-
drawal policy and stated that he would have voted for the Hart-Cooper amendment call-
ing for more research on the ABM system before its deployment.
On August 6, Harrington got a big boost when Nicholas Mavroules, the mayor of
Peabody, endorsed him.48 This move helped to offset Kane’s expected strength in Lynn,
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where he was mayor. On August 18, David Harrison, chairman of the state Democratic
party, also endorsed him. Both Burke and Kane were furious at Harrison, feeling that the
party chairman should have remained neutral during the primary. Rumors spread that
Harrison’s endorsement had the tacit approval of U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy.49
On the Republican side, Frank Hatch was a decided underdog. Not nearly as well
known nor as well financed as William Saltonstall, he had an uphill battle all the way. At
a debate in Gloucester, sponsored by the Cape Ann Concerned Citizens, Hatch attacked
Saltonstall by arguing that having a famous political name was not sufficient reason for
him to win the Republican nomination. Hatch reminded his audience that he had nearly
won his party’s nomination for lieutenant governor in 1966, but he lost by a whisker to
Frank Sargent. In taking stock of his own legislative achievements, Hatch pointed with
pride to the pioneer work he had done in the area of environmental policy, especially
with the passage of the so-called Hatch Act, which provided for wetlands protection. He
also cited his fight to obtain better rail commuter service for the North Shore and his
struggle to get overhead electrical power lines buried underground. But Hatch equivo-
cated on Vietnam. Skipping the Gloucester debate, Saltonstall conducted his informal
Walking with Salty campaign.
On August 26, the electorate voted in the primary. Harrington topped the Democrats
with 16,985 votes and Kane came in second with 9,130 votes, while Burke, who had
missed several of the debates, ran a distant third with 6,227 votes. In the Republican
primary, Hatch gave Saltonstall all the competition he could handle. He outdistanced
him in Beverly, Danvers, Hamilton, Topsfield, and Wenham. The outcome was much
closer than most political insiders had predicted. Only 2,487 votes separated them.
Saltonstall received 14,934 ballots compared with 12,347 for Hatch.50 After the primary,
Saltonstall remarked that he “would try to get out from under the name-brand umbrella
and would carry on his campaign as an individual with his own views and his own style
of politics.”51 By his own admission, he needed to find his voice, his message, and his
campaign style.
Now Harrington would go one on one with Saltonstall. It was a classic match-up with
a staid conservative Protestant out of Harvard pitted against an upstart liberal Catholic
out of Harvard. The former was the scion of a sterling Yankee blue blood family, the latter
the grandson of an Irish immigrant. The old ethnic and class tensions had been reacti-
vated and were played out as the campaign unfolded. Not surprisingly, Saltonstall, be-
cause of his illustrious family name and background, showed an early lead in public
opinion polls. It was Harrington’s turn to play the role of underdog.
The news media showed an intense interest in the race, mainly because of the defining
Vietnam War issue, and it became a major news story. News commentators depicted the
campaign as a battle between the hawks and the doves. It was not always easy to tell
them apart simply by party affiliation. It is well to remember that some Eisenhower Re-
publicans were early doves, while some Kennedy Democrats were persistent hawks. Party
lines were blurred. In his 1968 book, The Emerging Republican Majority, Kevin Phillips
expounded the theory that Nixon had won the White House with a Southern strategy that
sent a signal to both parties. No longer could Democrats rely on the South as a depend-
able redoubt of support nor could they take urban ethnic voters in the North for granted.
This special election was the first litmus test of Phillips’s theory. Moreover, it was im-
perative for President Nixon to keep the Sixth District a Republican seat. Therefore, the
National Republican Committee sent Charles Colson, one of its best political operatives,
to help. Colson, a seasoned back-room guy with a reputation for masterminding winning
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elections, was subsequently convicted and sent to prison for his role in the Watergate
scandal.
The Vietnam War caused debate in the United States long before it became Lyndon
Johnson’s war. In 1965, President Johnson gradually Americanized the war, deciding
first to bomb North Vietnam and then to send American ground forces into combat in
South Vietnam. The escalating war, which drained the nation’s resources to fund LBJ’s
Great Society programs and to fight the war against poverty at home, was generating a
contentious atmosphere. Antiwar radicals had demonstrated violently at the 1968 na-
tional Democratic convention in Chicago. Student protests and campus riots, which
soon became endemic, disrupted university life. Dissenting groups marched in the
streets, took over public buildings, and shut down colleges to protest what they be-
lieved to be an unjust war abroad in Southeast Asia and inequalities at home.
Against this background, the Americanization of the Vietnam War became the over-
riding campaign issue. Harrington’s strategy was to depict Saltonstall as supporting the
war and remaining loyal to President Richard Nixon, who was struggling to find an
honorable way out, but without much success. The Beverly Democrat was careful to let
voters know that he was opposed to Nixon’s policies as distinct from Republican poli-
cies, a subtle distinction that was not lost on independent voters.52 As expected,
Saltonstall came out in favor of Nixon’s policy on the war and on deployment of the
ABM system. In March 1969, Nixon agreed to a compromise that altered the purpose of
the ABM system to protecting American missile-launching sites against a Soviet first
strike. That scaled down its size, reduced its costs, and removed the system to less popu-
lated states like Montana and North Dakota. The program got through Congress by a
single vote in August, and two missile sites were eventually built.
To distinguish himself from his Republican opponent, Harrington called for a
speedier withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia and opposed the ABM
system as costing too much and escalating the arms race. By adopting such positions,
he veered to the left, thereby energizing his liberal antiwar base, the locus of Demo-
cratic restiveness. Both candidates conducted themselves in an exemplary manner.
They were dignified, polite, and occasionally eloquent. Although the debates were
heated, they never became personal. Neither candidate resorted to harsh words or nega-
tive campaigning. Harrington’s support built steadily while Saltonstall’s faltered. The
Beverly Democrat had a lot going for him that a successful campaign requires — en-
ergy, experience, allies, urgency, a break on the issues, and the absence of a charismatic
rival.
Near the end of the campaign, both candidates sought outside help by way of surro-
gates. Michael Dukakis, a liberal Democrat from Brookline who served with Harrington
as a state legislator, campaigned for him in the Greek community of Haverhill. Five
days before the election, U.S. Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine flew in from Washing-
ton to campaign for Harrington in Lynn. Former vice president Hubert Humphrey gave
him an enthusiastic endorsement as well. Congressman Allard K. Lowenstein of New
York, an outspoken opponent of Vietnam, also campaigned in his behalf. For his part,
Saltonstall countered with U.S. Senator Edward Brooke and Governor Frank Sargent,
who campaigned for him in Lynn and Salem.
The Harrington camp had flirted with the idea of bringing in U.S. Senator Edward
Kennedy to campaign but had second thoughts and decided against it. The
Chappaquiddick tragedy, in which Mary Jo Kopechne drowned, had recently occurred
on July 18, 1969. This tragedy, which ruined Kennedy’s chances for the presidency, was
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too fresh in the public mind. His moral failings at Chappaquiddick probably disqualified
him. In any case, it was sufficient reason to keep Kennedy under wraps — a personal
appearance was at best a risky proposition. So the idea was scrubbed, but Kennedy did
record a favorable radio tape-over message. Harrington had peaked perfectly, and the
final showdown was at hand.
On September 30, the voters went to the polls in a record turnout. After the polls
closed that evening, the returns came in slowly from the small rural towns because they
lacked voting machines and still counted their ballots by hand. A clue to how the elec-
tion might turn out came early when the town of Swampscott reported its returns.
Saltonstall carried this rock-ribbed Republican community by only 37 votes, a good
omen for the Harrington forces. In the end, Harrington received 72,030 votes compared
with 65,454 for Saltonstall. The Beverly Democrat won by 6,576 votes.53 Not only had
he vanquished his Yankee rival but he also vindicated his father’s 1941defeat.
A jubilant victory party was held election night at the Kings Grant in Danvers.
Harrington and his army of campaign workers were exultant; it was cause for great cel-
ebration. Not since 1874, ninety-five years earlier, had a Democrat won the Sixth Con-
gressional District. Among those offering congratulations was socialist Michael
Harrington, who in 1962 had written the popular bestseller The Other America. The latter
was described as the man who discovered poverty. The social critic appropriately signed
his congratulatory telegram The Other Mike Harrington.
Two weeks later, on October 15, a massive rally was held on the Boston Common to
observe the nationwide Vietnam Moratorium. A huge crowd estimated at 100,000 people
demonstrated their opposition to the war and shouted Peace Now. They heard Senator
George McGovern of South Dakota declare, “We seek not to break the President, but to
lift the terrible burden of the war from his shoulders and from the American people.”54
A Comparison of Father and Son
The relationship between father and son, dictated mainly by Joe Harrington’s political
necessities and his ambitions for his son, is most telling. A comparison of their congres-
sional races provides a fascinating story about ethnic and class rivalries, about revenge
and redemption, and about the interplay of personality and politics. Although the two
elections were held twenty-eight years apart, the father’s and son’s campaigns provided
some striking similarities and dissimilarities. For starters, both races were special elec-
tions to fill vacancies caused by the death of an incumbent congressman. Michael was
very much his father’s son. Both were lawyers, both were pacifists, and both were thirty-
three when they first ran for Congress — all accounts agree substantially on this. But
they shared common bonds beyond their father-son relationship. Neither had served in
the military so their pacifism came naturally, but they were not conscientious objectors.
Both were at odds with their party’s leadership and both invited political out-of-state
notables to campaign for them. Most of all, both were secure in their convictions about
how the world operated.
Otherwise, on every count, the two men differed in revealing ways. On the one hand,
Joseph Harrington was a conservative Democrat who appealed to right-wing reactionary
isolationists who opposed America’s entry into World War II. On the other, Michael
Harrington was a maverick liberal Democrat who appealed to leftist, radical antiwar
activists adamantly opposed to the Vietnam War. In sharp contrast, the father was a
staunch isolationist who forfeited the Jewish vote in 1941, whereas his son was an anti-
war advocate who was successful in courting Jews in 1969.
99
The father was a dynamic public speaker who could electrify a crowd with his daz-
zling rhetorical flourishes and his mellifluous voice, a real spellbinder who gave the Irish
a strong sense of identity and hope. By comparison, Michael was not a good public
speaker. He had trouble communicating and could not hold an audience in rapt attention
as his father did. A cerebral Democrat, he had a tendency either to talk down to people or
to talk over their heads. He often spoke in long, convoluted sentences. Some critics felt
that he was distant and aloof. Like Governor Michael Dukakis, he was more of a policy
wonk, and as such did not particularly enjoy the daily grind of street-level politics and
the arduous demands of constituent service work. He seldom played the Irish card, and
although he lacked his father’s charisma and common touch, most people were impressed
by his intellectual ability.
Given their dissimilarities in ideology and outlook, it is hardly surprising that father
and son differed in style and strategy. After all, they represented different generations,
operated in different times, and faced an entirely different set of issues. Their party affili-
ation, vote-drawing ability, and magic of the Harrington name were probably the only
constants. One thing is certain: they diverged where it counted most. The son was
elected to Congress, while his father suffered a humiliating defeat. Timing, of course, had
a lot to do with it.
Michael’s Unfulfilled Promise
There is much to admire in the career of Michael Harrington, who had the courage to
speak his convictions. His was a voice of conscience. Fresh from his congressional cam-
paign, he went to Washington in 1969 with what appeared to be a bright political future
ahead of him. Much was expected of Michael as he stepped into the national limelight.
He had potential greatness written all over him. Those expectations, however, were
largely dashed. He spent the next nine years in Congress, where he had a decent but
undistinguished career. The issues he chose to tackle were complicated — national secu-
rity, arms control, and intelligence operations. His performance record in Congress was at
best spotty. No major legislation bears his name. The stunning gap between promise and
unrealized potential was reflected in his lackluster and somewhat erratic execution.
From start to finish, Michael Harrington had trouble adjusting to the customs and
legislative procedures on Capitol Hill. When he arrived in Congress, the rule of defer-
ence was still very powerful. The late 1960s witnessed major procedural reforms in Con-
gress and a revolt against the seniority system and the power of committee chairmen. As
Michael Schudson explained in his magisterial The Good Citizen,
Subcommittees proliferated, decentralizing authority and providing multiple new points
of access for various constituencies, including minority groups. The members of Con-
gress became more co-equal, each member grew more dependent on his or her own
entrepreneurial endeavors and less dependent on currying favor with senior colleagues,
and increasingly even freshmen legislators could make speeches on the floor and pro-
pose significant policy initiatives.55
The Democratic party in Massachusetts was undergoing significant change. To quote
Jerome Mileur again,
There were reformers in the ranks of the Democrats, organizations like the Americans
for Democratic Action, but they remained on the margins of the party until the 1960s
when the anti-war movement brought new forces and a new generation into the party.
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The children of JFK, these activists for peace, environment, women, and minorities
transformed the Democrats in the 1970s and 1980s into a party of social liberalism,
marginalizing the older economic pragmatism and cultural conservatism. This was the
party of Michael Dukakis.56
It is in this context that Harrington’s subsequent political behavior is best understood.
As a freshman congressman, he joined the revolt that was already under way. For some-
one who played by his own rules, he chafed under the seniority system and wanted to do
away with it. He felt frustrated by what he perceived as archaic rules and folkways in a
Congress that was dominated by a club of elders, including barons of the old South. He
wanted to act right away and felt impatient with those who blocked action. His impetu-
ous behavior, a telling criticism, coupled with his penchant to stir things up, eventually
landed him in trouble. He was somewhat of a loner and not a particularly collegial mem-
ber of the House. His prickly personality and poor attendance record in Congress did not
help matters.
Initially, Harrington was assigned to the Banking and Currency Committee and the
Armed Services Committee, but he quickly became disenchanted with what he consid-
ered mundane assignments. Seeking help from fellow Massachusetts Democrat and
House majority leader Tip O’Neill, he got himself reassigned to the more prestigious
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Government Operations Committee. His work on the
latter two committees had the most impact.
The winding down of the war in Vietnam resulted in an examination of the role of
intelligence agencies in shaping foreign and defense policy. Moreover, the 1974
Watergate investigations had revealed the extent to which presidential administrations
had attempted to cover up politically embarrassing activities under the guise of national
security. Investigative journalists uncovered evidence that intelligence agencies such as
the CIA and the FBI were involved in questionable covert operations overseas as well as
in domestic surveillance of antiwar protesters and other opponents of government poli-
cies at home. It was further revealed that these practices were widespread throughout the
late 1960s and early 1970s.
As a result, House Speaker Carl Albert appointed a Select Intelligence Committee in
1975 to investigate these matters. Lucien Nedzi, a conservative Democrat from Michi-
gan, who was named as chair, turned out to be a controversial choice. Shortly after his
appointment, it was revealed that Nedzi had received secret briefings in 1974 about
illegal CIA operations, but he had failed to inform the committee. This situation troubled
his fellow Democrats, especially Harrington, and they pressed for Nedzi’s removal.
In a highly unusual move, Harrington once again threw caution to the wind. He re-
leased to the public secret testimony that had been given by CIA director William Colby.
It related the CIA’s covert role in the overthrow of Salvador Allende’s leftist government
in Chile on September 11, 1973. Adam Clymer, the Washington correspondent for The
New York Times, put it this way,
The [Nixon] administration had poured millions of dollars into efforts to defeat Allende
in 1970 and tried to stimulate a coup then. After Allende took power, it sought to
squeeze Chile through international financial institutions. There is no evidence of U.S.
government involvement in the 1973 coup, but the administration quickly recognized the
new government despite the murders of Allende and thousands of others.57
Harrington’s release of the secret testimony shook up Capitol Hill. The fight promised
to be a lonely one, and the danger of such a game lay in the possibility of punishment
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and retribution. It prompted Republican Congressman Robin L. Beard of Tennessee to
file a complaint against Harrington for his apparent violation of House rules,  seeking to
have him either reprimanded or censured. The House Ethics Committee voted to investi-
gate the complaint and to hold a hearing.
Harrington, of course, saw the controversy in a much different light and felt that he
was being attacked unfairly. Convinced of the rectitude of his cause, he declared, “What
is really at issue here is the failure of the Congress to discharge its responsibilities as an
overseer of intelligence security. The issue is not Michael Harrington, but the use of the
CIA and government secrecy in general to short-circuit the democratic process and cover
up illegal activity. I remain convinced that what I did last year was responsible and
proper under the circumstances.”58  He had said all that he intended to say on the subject,
but he sent a signal to the Nixon administration. Whether or not the effort to censure him
contributed to his disillusionment with politics, it took courage to blow the whistle and
to expose what the federal government had been doing.
During this stage of the Cold War, liberals like Harrington, on the one hand, often
warned the nation about the danger of eroding civil liberties. Conservatives, on the other
hand, supported virtually every expansion of power by federal authorities, for example,
domestic surveillance or wiretapping of suspected subversives, as an indispensable
weapon in the war against Communism.
Given his predicament, Harrington once again sought help from Tip O’Neill, who
intervened on his behalf and saved him from a formal vote of censure. Tip warned
Harrington, however, that he had used up his political capital and should not expect any
further help from him. In this highly politicized atmosphere, the select committee was
reconstituted with the same mandate but with a different chair. Both Nedzi and
Harrington were disciplined, the two men being removed from the reconstituted commit-
tee.59
The energy crisis and the Arab oil embargo had set off a scramble for scarce energy
resources, and in 1976 Harrington proposed creating a Massachusetts Power Authority.
The idea was for the state to build and operate electric generating plants and sell power
to local electric companies for distribution to their customers. The private electric com-
panies doing business in Massachusetts were strongly opposed to Harrington’s push for
state-run electricity. The question was placed on the ballot as a public referendum but
was soundly defeated by the electorate.60
Harrington’s impatience continued, but his patently unfulfilled ambition lent cre-
dence to the perception that he was a man possessed. A former aide put it even more
crisply: “Look at him. He’s gone through seven administrative assistants in seven years
for Christ’s sake.” In a 1977 interview, Harrington candidly acknowledged his own con-
flicting emotions, “I am impatient with myself, with other people and with life.” Reporter
Charles Kenney wrote in The Free Paper, “Harrington’s impatience has caused some to
question his political maturity and his commitment to his job in Congress. He hasn’t
mastered the fine art of waiting. Horny dogs do a better job of masking their ambi-
tions.”61
Almost everyone thought that Harrington would challenge Republican incumbent
Edward Brooke for the U.S. Senate in 1978. Brooke appeared vulnerable because of a
scandal in which he apparently had falsified his personal finances in a divorce proceed-
ing. Harrington was concerned that his liberal supporters would view such a challenge as
untenable. It would have pitted a liberal Democrat against the lone liberal black in the
Senate. Besides, Harrington also happened to be a close friend of Ed Brooke. They had
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vacationed near each other on the island of St. Martin. Rather than trying to move up,
Harrington decided to move out. His best chance for the U.S. Senate had come and gone.
Congressman Paul Tsongas of Lowell, who did not share such qualms, challenged and
defeated Brooke in 1978. Coincidentally, this was the same year that Kevin Harrington
resigned as state Senate president.
Faced with the prospect of strong competition within his own party, Mike Harrington
left Congress in 1978 at age forty-two. This intraparty contest came from Peabody mayor
Nicholas Mavroules and state representative James Smith from Lynn. Politics and na-
tional office no longer  held any allure. Harrington cited personal finances as the main
reason for his leaving. He could no longer support his growing family on a
congressman’s salary. He felt that he should be making more money at this stage of his
life. Many of his constituents were sorely disappointed in his decision to leave. Com-
pared with his colleagues Tip O’Neill, Edward Boland, and Joseph Moakley, he had
neither their patience nor their staying power. They did better and lasted longer, all of
which underscored the tragic shortfall of his achievement.
At this juncture, Michael Harrington, the once luminous political star, returned to his
private law practice in Salem. He became a real estate developer and part owner of the
prestigious Hawthorne Hotel, which was managed by Michael Garvin. Harrington also
served briefly as a director of the Federal Reserve Bank in Boston. In 1990, he made an
abortive attempt to run for state treasurer in Massachusetts. After taking out a $20,000
personal loan to finance his campaign, he suddenly withdrew from the race. He was rest-
less still, but seemed to be driven more by business than political ambition.
In due course, Harrington’s business activities landed him in trouble. A decade later,
in early January 2000, the U.S. Attorney’s office in Boston charged him with misrepre-
senting his finances to obtain bank loans to buy the Hawthorne Hotel and the Museum
Place Mall in Salem, and to finance his futile bid for state treasurer.62 Rather than enter-
ing into a plea bargain and settling the case out of court, Harrington decided to fight the
charges. He was indicted on St. Valentine’s Day. As this was written, the case was still
pending.
Neil’s Political Dead End
In 1997, Neil Harrington, who had already served four terms as mayor of Salem, failed to
win his bid for reelection — he was defeated by insurgent city councilor Stanley J.
Usovicz, Jr. At the time, public opinion polls indicated that Harrington had a high nega-
tive rating. Sensing that the incumbent mayor was vulnerable, Usovicz conducted a low-
key door-to-door campaign. His emphasis on improving public schools resonated with
Salem voters, especially the upwardly mobile business and professional people. Usovicz,
whose parents were of Lithuanian and Irish extraction, was perceived by many voters as
“a local boy who made good.” He won overwhelmingly. In fact, Neil Harrington lost
every precinct in the city. He had seriously alienated the schoolteachers by his comments
that there were not enough votes for increased public school funding. As a result of this
political gaffe, the teachers were adamantly opposed to his reelection. The education
vote was big  in the city. Spearheaded by Jane Dwyer, who organized the anti-Harrington
forces, the teachers worked hard to defeat him.
Most big city mayors tend to have a limited “shelf life,” especially if they try to ac-
complish a great deal in office. This was certainly true in Neil Harrington’s case — he
could claim a host of accomplishments. Salem, much like Lynn, was an old industrial
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city badly in need of economic revitalization. Harrington was largely responsible for
turning the city around and making it more viable economically. He attracted more fed-
eral money than any previous mayor. Among numerous other things, he established the
Federal Street School, which was a unique two-way bilingual school for English- and
Spanish-speaking students. The Saltonstall School was converted to a K–5 grammar
school. The mayor initiated the reconstruction of Riley Plaza, thereby eliminating a
hazardous rotary and dramatically improving the safety and aesthetics of Salem’s main
downtown thoroughfare. Significantly, he broke decisively with his cousin Michael
Harrington and firmly resisted his attempts to obtain tax concessions from the city for the
Hawthorne Hotel. The latter dispute was his profile in courage.
While Neil Harrington had his strengths, he also had his weaknesses. He struck most
people as cold, reserved, and aloof. He was outwardly stiff and seemingly humorless.
More telling, he was unable to schmooze with reporters and voters. That kind of personal
rigidity lessened his effectiveness. Critics were extremely harsh on him, some claiming
that he was arrogant, rude, and immature. Others described him as a rigid, uptight Irish
guy, who was secretive and controlling. He had brought aboard in his administration one
David Shea, a manipulative political operative whom many constituents disliked and
distrusted. This only earned Harrington the contempt of friends and enemies, all of which
worked to the advantage of Usovicz and contributed to Neil’s downfall. He had planned
to run for lieutenant governor in 1998, but those plans obviously went awry. Trapped in
his own rigidity, he ran for sheriff of Essex County and lost. The magic had gone out of
the enterprise, and the glory days were over. A sad shadow of his father, Neil symbolized
the family’s political downfall.
Where Have All the Irish Gone?
This all seems clear in retrospect. Neil Harrington’s defeat dashed any serious notion of
the Harringtons as a continuing political family dynasty. Since Neil was on the way out
and Usovicz was on the way in, politicians read the signs accordingly. Something more
was involved. Generally speaking, the decline of the Harringtons can be linked to the
decline of the potency of the Irish political organization. This phenomenon is not some-
thing new, having been going on for some time.
In the sixteen gubernatorial elections held between1952 and 1998, only one Irish-
American, Edward King, won the prize. Of the fifteen other winners, four were Yankees
(Herter, Peabody, Sargent, and William Weld); three were Italians (Furcolo, Volpe, and
Paul Cellucci); and one was Greek (Dukakis). In length of service, Dukakis set a new
record of election to three four-year terms, or an unprecedented twelve years. The previ-
ous record was held by John Hancock, the first governor of Massachusetts, who served
eleven annual terms between 1780 and the early 1790s.
Further evidence of the Irish disappearance can be seen in the decline of clans like the
McCormacks and the Kennedys. Other notable Irish politicians like James M. Curley,
Tip O’Neill, Maurice Donahue, Robert Quinn, David Bartley, Kevin White, Raymond
Flynn, and Dapper O’Neil have all departed from the political scene. And the list goes
on. This raises the question: Where have all the Irish gone? Much like their former Yan-
kee adversaries, they have gone into banking and business. As Brian Sullivan pointed
out,
A quick look at the profiles of Boston’s prominent Irish-Americans shows that virtually
all of them serve on the [American Ireland] Fund’s board. And what a collection: A man
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named Lynch has carved out a reputation as the smartest stock-picker in the country. A
man named Murray runs the region’s largest bank. A priest named Monan presides
over one of the region’s most preeminent educational institutions and, on the side,
brought about the building of the Fleet Center. A man named Purcell saved the city’s
second largest newspaper and runs it with verve and innovation. A man named
Connors runs the region’s most successful ad agency and an O’Neill runs one of the
region’s most influential private lobbying and PR firms. A kid named Regan — he’ll
always be so because of his red-haired, boyish looks — runs the other big PR shop in
town.63
The decline of the Irish can also be explained by a state being demographically trans-
formed. Women and minorities have displaced them to some extent. They are challenged
increasingly by those who feel they have been denied the opportunity to advance politi-
cally. This is especially true of Italian-Americans who have risen to prominent positions
of power in both parties.
At the moment, Paul Cellucci sits in the governor’s chair. Boston mayor Thomas
Menino, who is nearing the end of his second term, has already indicated that he will run
again next year and break a pledge he made to leave office after two terms.64 It should
also be noted that Raymond Mariano currently presides as mayor of Worcester; while
Michael Albano serves as mayor of Springfield, and so on. In 1998, former Somerville
mayor Michael Capuano won the congressional seat formerly held by Tip O’Neill and
John F.  Kennedy. Furthermore, Italians occupy positions in business, civic, social, and
religious circles throughout the state. Their time has come. The larger question is, What
will be the role of the Irish, if any, in the new politics? Their gradual disappearance from
the political scene may signal their ultimate last hurrah.z
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